



**Industry Releasable Threat Bulletin (IRTB) 048**  
**UPDATE number 3 (Final Update): Issued 12 NOV 2025**  
**Issued: 06 NOV 2025**  
**Latest IRTA 20 MAR 25**



**For General Use.** This threat bulletin has been released to the Shipping Industry.

1. **Foreword.** This Industry Releasable Threat Bulletin (IRTB) has been written by Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) ATALANTA. It is intended to help shipping operators who are responsible for merchant and large commercial fishing vessels that pass through or operate in the Western Indian Ocean, Gulf of Oman, Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
2. **Purpose.** The purpose of this IRTB is to inform the shipping industry about the ongoing PAG situation. The current active PAG is considered responsible for the events that took place on the 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> November respectively.
3. **Incident.**
  - Event 1 – Attempted boarding.
  - Event 2 – No Maritime Security Event.
  - Event 3 – Attempted boarding.
  - Event 4 – Piracy - Boarding.
  - Event 5 – Attempted Boarding.
4. **Date/time.**
  - Event 1 – 02/11/2025 (1600hrs Somalia time).
  - Event 2 – 02/11/2025 (2000hrs Somalia time).
  - Event 3 – 03/11/2025 (0445hrs Somalia time).
  - Event 4 – 06/11/2025 (0800hrs Somalia time).
  - Event 5 – 07/11/2025 (0800hrs Somalia time)
5. **Location.**

Event 1 – Aprox. 360nm from Mogadishu (Pos 00-21S 050-58E)




Figure 1. Event 1 position and distance from Mogadishu.

Event 2 – Aprox 446nm from Mogadishu (Pos 03-36S 051-01E)




Figure 2. Event 2 position and distance from Mogadishu.

Event 3 – Aprox. 330nm from Mogadishu (Pos 00-03N 050-31E)




Figure 3. Event 3 position and distance from Mogadishu.

Event 4 – Aprox. 760nm from Mogadishu (Pos 02-07N 057-14E)




Figure 4. Event 4 position and distance from Mogadishu.

## Event 5 – Aprox. 700nm from Mogadishu (Pos 03-32N 057-05E)




Figure 5. Event 5 position and distance from Mogadishu.

## 6. Incident Description.

Event 1 – 02/11/2025 (1600hrs Somalia time). FV INTERTUNA TRES (Flag Seychelles) reported that a high speed skiff was approaching their stern. The skiff came from a mother vessel with AIS 'ISSAMOHAMADI2'. The PAST (security forces) on board FV INTERTUNA TRES shoot 2 warning shot and the skiff immediately turned around to the mother ship.

Event 2 – 02/11/2025 (2000hrs Somalia time). MV SPAR APUS (Flag Norway) reported a boat that approached them with 15kts. Boat had no AIS and were not answering to VHF calls. MV SPAR APUS changed course to 170 and increased speed to 30kts to increase her distance from the suspicious vessel.

Event 3 – 03/11/2025 (0445hrs Somalia time). MV STOLT SAGALAND (Flag Cayman Islands) reported that 4 unauthorised persons attempted to board his vessel from a small craft. There was a mother ship 5nm from their position. Persons on board the small craft shoot several rounds from AK47 type weapon towards the MV. The PAST (security forces) on board MV STOLT SAGALAND started to shoot back and the small craft abandoned the attempt of boarding.

Event 4 – 06/11/2025 (0800hrs Somalia time). MT HELLAS APHRODITE was boarded by a PAG (see figure 4). The crew stayed in the citadel. PAG left the MT. EUNAV FOR op ATALANATA assets on 7<sup>th</sup> NOV liberated the crew, which are all in good health.

Event 5 – 07/11/2025 (0800hrs Somalia time) MV AL THUMAMA was approached by a skiff with 3 POBs (see Figure 5). The vessel increased speed and avoided the skiff.

**Event 6- 11/11/2025 (1800 Somalia time) EUNAVFOR ATALANTA assets spotted the Iranian Hijacked Dhow reported on 28/10/25 (see IRTB 047) ISSAMOHAMD1 and confirmed that the PAG forced to abandon the dhow and return to Somalia.(UPDATE)**

## 7. Vessel's Details

Vessel name	Vessel Flag
FV INTERTUNA TRES	Seychelles
MV SPAR APUS	Norway
MV STOLT SAGALAND	Cayman Islands
MT HELLAS APHRODITE	Malta
MV AL THUMAMA	Marshall Islands

## 8. Assessment.

Event 1 – The data collected indicating PAG activity. Specifically attempted boarding. It is HIGHLY LIKELY that the Iranian Hijacked Dhow reported on 28/10/25 (see IRTB 047) was used as the mother vessel for this event. The Iranian dhow is ALMOST CERTAIN named ISSAMOHAMD1 and is not shining AIS.

Event 2 – The data collected indicating no PAG activity

Event 3 – The data collected indicating PAG activity. Specifically attempted boarding. It is HIGHLY LIKELY that the Iranian Hijacked Dhow reported on 28/10/25 (see IRTB 047) was used as the mother vessel for this event. The Iranian dhow is ALMOST CERTAIN named ISSAMOHAMD1 and is not shining AIS.

Event 4 – The data collected indicating PAG activity. Specifically boarding/piracy. It is HIGHLY LIKELY that the Iranian Hijacked Dhow as described in event 1 is involved.

Event 5 – The data collected indicates a SUSPICIOUS APPROACH performed by the same PAG as above events.

**Event 6- It is HIGHLY LIKELY that the PAG was forced to abandon the dhow as it became obvious that they were closely monitored and not able to perform attacks against MV. (UPDATE)**

## 9. Recommendations

- Vessels are requested to remain vigilant and to adhere to BMP Maritime Security when transiting the Western Indian Ocean and the Somali waters. While these waters are routinely patrolled by CMF, EUNAVFOR ATALANTA and other warships, the timely and comprehensive reporting of incidents and suspicious activity remains crucial to allow for a rapid incident response.
- We request that, where possible, and without endangering the vessel or crew, vessels obtain and report as much factual details as possible of incidents and suspicious activity to include logs, photographs, video, and radar footage. CSO's and masters are strongly recommended to register their vessels with MSCIO when entering the Voluntary Reporting Area and to report any incidents to UKMTO in accordance with BMP Maritime Security. This

will enable a more rapid response to incidents and allow CMF and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA to monitor activity, enabling the most effective allocation of resources.

- c. CSOs are recommended to gather information on known Pattern of Life and Maritime Domain Awareness along the intended route and ports of call when conducting risk assessments for their fleets.

## 10. Threat Assessment for Piracy, as per Figure 7.




Figure 7. Piracy threat assessment Map

THREAT ASSESSMENT	BENIGN	LOW	MODERATE	SUBSTANTIAL	SEVERE	CRITICAL
YARDSTICK	An attack is <b>HIGHLY UNLIKELY</b> (10% – 20%)	An attack is <b>UNLIKELY</b> (>25% – 35%)	An attack is a <b>REALISTIC POSSIBILITY</b> (40% – <50%)	An attack is <b>LIKELY / PROBABLE</b> (55% – <75%)	An attack is <b>HIGHLY LIKELY</b> (80% – 90%)	An attack is <b>ALMOST CERTAIN</b> (>95%)

## 11. Publication.

- a. Produced by CMF and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA.
- b. Published by MSCIO.

## 12. Feedback. Enquiries about the content of this bulletin should be directed to CMF and EUNAVFOR;

- (1) **CMF:**
- (2) **Tel:** 00973 1785 7009 // 00973 1785 4799
- (3) **Website:** [www.combinedmaritimeforces.com](http://www.combinedmaritimeforces.com)

(4) **Email:** combinedmaritimeforces@gmail.com

**EUNAVFOR ATALANTA:**

(5) **Tel:** 0033 (0) 298 220 220 // 0033 298 220 170.

(6) **Website:** [www.mscio.eu](http://www.mscio.eu)

(7) **Email:** postmaster@mscio.eu