

Industry Releasable Threat Assessment



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Introduction

1. This Industry Releasable Threat Assessment (IRTA) has been prepared by the European Union Naval Force Operation ATALANTA (EU NAVFOR ATALANTA) and the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF).
2. The purpose of the IRTA is to articulate the maritime security threat to merchant and large fishing vessels transiting the Red Sea (RS), Bab al Mandeb Strait (BAM), Gulf of Aden (GOA) and the Western Indian Ocean (WIO). It replaces the previous IRTA released on 01 April 24, which had an intelligence cut-off date (ICOD) of 01 December 25. Please note that this IRTA is complementary to any post-ICOD information provided after its publication by the CMF Joint Maritime Information Centre (JMIC) uploaded on the UKMTO website (<https://www.ukmto.org/indian-ocean/jmic-products>) and the Piracy Threat Update uploaded on the MSCIO website (<https://www.msco.eu/mscio-products/eunavfor-atalanta/>).

Yemen Threat Environment

3. The maritime security situation in Red Sea and Gulf of Aden is largely influenced on the ongoing situation in Houthi controlled Yemen.

- a. **Recent Events**

Since the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, on 9 October 25, Houthi halted their attacks on Israel and no attacks on merchant vessel have taken place. The last attack against Israel was on 8 October 25 and the latest against a merchant vessel was on 29 September 25. Nevertheless, Houthi reiterated that they will monitor the situation in Gaza Strip, and are going to react if necessary. Also, Houthi leader stressed, that peace and stability in the region are impossible, and certainly they are heading for another confrontation with Israel. Thus, the Houthi's position will depend on Gaza developments (particularly with regards to the recovery of hostages, the disarmament of Hamas and the ongoing occupation of Palestine). Although there have been violations of the ceasefire by both sides, Hamas and Israel have affirmed their commitment to the peace deal.

- b. **Capability**

The Houthi's operational evolution – adaptability and ongoing development of maritime strike capabilities suggest they retain the initiative and their geographical position is giving them a major operational/tactical advantage. The situation in the Red Sea, Bab-El-Mandeb Strait and Gulf of Aden remains volatile and a sudden reaction of Houthi cannot be ruled out. The Houthi announcement on 9 November 2025, is a reaffirmation of their cessation of attacks towards MVs and Israel.

Vessels' transit through the SoH continues uninterrupted, although occasional GPS interference might affect navigation safety, while the likelihood of boarding or seizure is low, although it cannot be entirely ruled out.

EUNAVFOR ASPIDES recommendations towards the Shipping Industry are adapted accordingly. Major shipping companies are informed and the MSCIO website is updated to be aligned with shipping industry's needs.

Piracy Related Threat – A projection to the Future

4. The threat of piracy and armed robbery continues to simmer mainly in Somali waters. Related contours are as follows:

a. **Recent Events**. See Annex A.

b. **Capability**.

The events described in Annex A indicate the possible presence of active pirate groups off the Somali coast exploiting the vulnerability of foreign fishing vessels operating in Somali waters, exacerbating the piracy threat in the area. The capability of Somali pirates is characterized by over fifteen years of experience navigating the local maritime environment and leveraging the region's complex coastal geography. While piracy along the Somali coast was largely suppressed by 2012 due to robust onshore and offshore countermeasures, the threat persists, sustained by the pirates' adaptability and operational knowledge. Rather than maintaining strong, direct operational ties to terrorist groups, Somali pirates have historically engaged in pragmatic, transactional relationships with entities like Al-Shabaab (AS). These interactions have typically involved paying harbor fees or exchanging resources, such as weapons or logistical support, rather than forming a unified command structure. Hijacked fishing vessels can still be utilized as motherships to launch pirate attacks further offshore, extending their range beyond Somalia's immediate coastal waters, as happened in November 2025. Recently, there has been a discussion of a possible alliance between AS and Houthis and whether such alliance can amplify the capacity of pirate action groups. According to the information gathered, the cooperation between Houthis and AS seems to be opportunistic and far from becoming something really meaningful and capable to change the overall balance in the area. Furthermore, AS, as mentioned above, has not expressed any real interest in piracy and that is not expected to change even if its capabilities as well as its influence increase over more territories in Somalia. Actually the southern part of Somalia where AS is usually more active and influential experiences no pirate attacks.

c. **Industry Impact.**

For the upcoming months NO intense activity of Pirate Action Groups is expected on the Gulf of Aden, Somali Basin and Western Indian Ocean. However, there is always the possibility of a pirate group to be formed in Somalia with the capacity to set sail and attack vulnerable merchant vessels directly from the shore, therefore constant deterrence is necessary and is planned to be achieved through targeted operations and enhanced surveillance from EUNAVFOR ATALANTA assets and its regional partners in Maritime Security. Furthermore the armed robbery threat in Somali TTW's will continue to be present primarily to fishing vessels, for the same time frame. Vessels are encouraged to register with MSCIO and report any suspicious activity to UKMTO, as well as to follow BMP MS protective measures.

Terrorism-Illicit Activities

5. No terrorist incidents were reported in the maritime domain during the reporting period. Houthi forces were recently redesignated as a terrorist organisation by the US. Houthi actions & corresponding impact are covered in paragraph 3 of this report. The threat from terrorism (excluding the Houthi threat) in the maritime domain is assessed as **BENIGN**. A terrorist attack in the region is **UNLIKELY**.

Nothing to report with regards to Illicit Activities.

CMF Activity

6. CMF operates five Combined Task Forces and an Information Center, delivering effects across the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Somali Basin, Northern Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Gulf to counter threats to commerce, regional stability and maritime security.

CMF is routinely conducting Maritime Security Operations (MSO) and exercises with air and surface units in the Area of Operation (AOO) in order to deter, through presence, illicit non-state actors from the use of the high seas, to ensure freedom of navigation, to preserve the International Rules Based Order and to reassure the maritime community.

CMF collaborates with partner organizations, such as EUNAVFOR, with active support from Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and growing involvement from South East Asian nations. CMF has five Combined Task Forces that are led by CMF member nations. The details are as under:

- a. CTF 150 is being commanded by Saudi Arabian-led team since August 2025. Prior to their command, the CTF was led by New Zealand.
- b. CTF 151 is being commanded by Brazilian-led team since August 2025. Prior this it was a Pakistan led task force.

- c. CTF 152 is being commanded by Qatari-led team starting September 2025. Prior to their command, Kuwait Navy led the CTF.
- d. CTF 153 is currently commanded by CMF head quarter since late October 2025. Egyptian Navy was previously in command of this task force.
- e. CTF 154 is an Italian-led team since August 25, taking over from Sri Lankan Navy team.

EU NAVFOR Activity

7. During the reporting period, EUNAVFOR ATALANTA has continued to fulfil its mandate as a key contributor to maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean. Over the past nine months, the operation has effectively adapted to the evolving regional dynamics, achieving significant milestones and substantial strategic gains. In a nutshell, EUNAVFOR ATALANTA maintained a pivotal role in combating piracy, protecting humanitarian efforts, monitoring Illegal Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, transforming its Maritime Security Centre to better standards, and improving the regional maritime security architecture through enhancing cooperation with regional countries and other naval operations.

8. Containing piracy remains a cornerstone of Operation ATALANTA's mission. During the reporting period, there was only the activity described on Annex A caused by a single PAG. This reflects the sustained deterrence achieved through targeted operations and enhanced surveillance carried out all year around. This achievement is particularly notable given the prior resurgence of piracy during especially the first 6-months of 2024, which had posed significant challenges in the region. By deploying resources strategically, international coordination, and exploiting intelligence, ATALANTA has effectively contained and deterred pirate networks and ensured more secure maritime conditions for all seafarers.

9. The operation intensified its maritime security efforts, executing several focused operations with CMF Combined Task Forces, joint activities at sea, cooperation with Seychelles, and with Oman, a substantial increase compared to previous periods. Partnerships with entities such as the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and Regional Maritime Centres, including those in Seychelles and Oman, have enhanced interoperability and improved maritime situational awareness. These collaborations are vital for addressing complex maritime threats and fostering regional security. The regional recognition, support, and willingness to exercise with ATALANTA reflect the level of confidence and trust that has been achieved.

10. EU NAVFOR ATALANTA will continue its counter-piracy operations in the GoA and in the Somali Basin, whilst monitoring and protecting World Food Program (WFP) ships and vulnerable vessels that requested it.

In addition, EU NAVFOR ATALANTA will continue to coordinate with relevant Somali authorities in the fight against counter-piracy, thereby, bolstering deterrence against potential pirates.

11. EU NAVFOR ATALANTA will continue to improve coordination and information exchange with relevant partners in the Indian Ocean, in order to obtain a comprehensive picture in the AOO and operate more efficiently with available resources against all kinds of illicit activities. EU NAVFOR ATALANTA will also continue to work in close coordination with the shipping industry to ensure the safety of sea farers .

12. EU NAVFOR ATALANTA maintains its maritime security presence by conducting Focus Operations aimed at addressing illicit activities such as drug trafficking, charcoal smuggling and weapons trafficking. EUNAVFOR ATALANTA is also continuing to develop its procedures to counter other illegal activities.

13. Focus Operations aim to better overview and monitor fishing activities, focusing on those that could be Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) in the AOO.

14. EUNAVFOR ASPIDES primary focus is to protect merchant shipping and restore freedom of navigation (FoN) by contributing to maritime security, within South Red Sea (SRS), Bab-El-Mandeb (BAM) Strait and Gulf of Aden (GOA) where the majority of Houthi's attacks have been carried out.

15. EUNAVFOR ASPIDES assets daily support shipping with protection or monitoring operations.

16. EUNAVFOR ASPIDES monitoring operations are a way to build up confidence of the maritime shipping industry. Thus, EUNAVFOR ASPIDES provides reassurance to the MV, while on the other hand being ready to respond to emergencies.

17. EUNAVFOR ASPIDES, EUNAVFOR ATALANTA, and EUNAVFORMED IRINI. continuously monitors Shadow Fleet

18. EUNAVFOR ASPIDES collects and share information about arms smuggling with other partners/operations in order to shape and understand the battlespace.

19. Senior Leadership Engagements through Key Leader Engagements (KLE) are focusing on enhancing coordination and strengthening regional cooperation.

MSCIO

20. After almost one year since its transformation from MSCHOA (Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa) to MSCIO (Maritime Security Centre – Indian Ocean), and following the launch of the new website, MSCIO has been working intensively to ensure a smooth transition and to avoid any negative impact on the support provided to the shipping industry.

21. Registrations have not only remained stable but have increased, demonstrating both the effectiveness of MSCIO effort during the transformation and the strong confidence placed by the shipping industry in the services and support provided by Operation ATALANTA within the Area of Operations (AOO).

22. It is highly recommended that ships and companies continue to register with MSCIO. It is not only essential to register upon entering the Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA), but also to submit a Final Report once the vessel has arrived at her Port of Call (POC) or has exited the VRA. Furthermore, the use of the online reporting formats is strongly encouraged, as they provide the fastest and most accurate means of registration.

Operations/ MSCIO Analysis

23. Regarding incidents during the reporting period and in recent weeks, following the Gaza peace pact, the number of attacks in the Red Sea, Bab el Mandeb and Gulf of Aden has decreased significantly. Likewise, a noticeable reduction in GNSS disruptions has been observed in the Red Sea, Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman. Nevertheless, Masters are advised to remain vigilant should the conflict reoccur.

24. On the other hand, recent events in November confirm that piracy remains active in the western Indian Ocean. Pirate Action Groups (PAG) have demonstrated their ability to operate at extended ranges from the coastline. Their typical modus operandi involves the seizure and hijacking of a dhow, which is subsequently used as a mother ship. From there, pirates blend into normal maritime traffic and deploy skiffs to launch attacks at distances of up to 700 nautical miles from the East Somali coast.

25. Although attacks in the Gulf of Aden are considered less likely, they should not be discounted, as hijacked vessels can be used as mother ships.

26. Last pirate events have also demonstrated high level of violence of the pirates, with the confirmed use of weapons such as AK-47 rifles and RPGs (rocket propelled grenades).

27. Evidence shows that proper implementation of the BMP has successfully prevented several boarding attempts. Measures such as increasing speed to maximum and the presence of armed security teams on board have proved to be particularly effective. Moreover, the availability of a properly prepared citadel has been shown to be critical in ensuring crew survivability.

28. Recent piracy events have also highlighted the importance of registering with MSCIO when transiting the VRA in order to receive real-time alerts and to ensure immediate support in the event of an incident.

29. MSCIO continues to work closely with partner organisations such as UKMTO and JMIC under the Single Information Framework (SIF), as well as with MICA Center and IOF-IOR, to exchange information and disseminate accurate maritime security data to the industry in a timely manner.

Conclusions.

30. The situation in Red Sea, Bab-El-Mandeb Strait and Gulf of Aden remains volatile and connected with the evolution in Gaza. Thus, a sudden reaction of Houthis, based on their operational capabilities cannot be ruled out. Vessels' transit through Red Sea and SoH continues mainly uninterrupted. EUNAVFOR ASPIDES recommendations towards the Shipping Industry are adapted frequently. Major shipping companies are informed accordingly through the MSCIO website.

31. The security situation in Yemen remains volatile, over the last 9 months we have seen three serious maritime security incidents. These marks the sinking of the merchant vessel ETERNITY C and MAGIC SEAS and the attack in the Gulf of Aden on the MV Minervagracht carried out by Houthi forces.

32. Both EUNAVFORs and CMF assess that the threat to Israel affiliated shipping is still there.

33. Post the recent Israel and Hamas ceasefire and the first phase of a U.S.-arranged peace deal, the Houthis have announced that they will cease attacks on Israel, but that they will be monitoring the situation closely. All Intel branches of the tree missions monitor the situation closely and expect a reduced number of attacks should the ceasefire hold firm.

34. Nevertheless, the Houthis will highly likely continue to seek to gain legitimacy and recognition on the global stage. Recent Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile attacks in the Northern Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, demonstrate that the Houthi's seek to increase pressure on Israel by targeting Israeli linked entities, including vessels with indirect and obscure linkages.

35. Despite the efforts of international naval forces and regional authorities, maritime security risks persist. However, this report also demonstrates the value of collaborative efforts between CMF, EUNAVFORs and industry stakeholders in assessing and mitigating these threats. By sharing intelligence, best practices, and expertise, we can reduce the risk of maritime threats and promote a safer, more secure operating environment for all.

36. As we move forward, it is essential that we continue to work together to address the complex and dynamic nature of maritime threats in the region. This includes enhancing information-sharing mechanisms, developing more effective counter-measures, and promoting a culture of security awareness and cooperation throughout the maritime community.

37. The Houthis' have not publicly claimed any strikes on Israel or Israeli affiliated shipping since 05 OCT 25. This is HIGHLY LIKELY the result of Hamas' commitment to President Donald Trump's peace plan, despite persistent ceasefire violations. Houthi leadership continue to promote supportive messaging to Hamas concerning the ceasefire, HIGHLY LIKELY reminding the international community that they are poised to re-start their military operations if Hamas deem the peace plan to have failed. As we move into the next stages of President Donald Trump's Peace Plan, which addresses the disarming of Hamas, it is HIGHLY LIKELY that the Houthis' will increase their rhetoric in support of Hamas, iot add negotiating power to Hamas where talks will HIGHLY LIKELY centre on the group's disarmament.

38. Houthi forces continue to exhibit the ability to launch Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs), ballistic missiles, UAVs and USVs, targeting vessels sanctioned under their PAYAIS list in the RS, BaM and GoA. Although their precision is limited it has improved since the start of their campaign in 2023. Their arsenal, includes long-range weaponry and enhanced targeting capabilities, all of which pose a credible threat to those transiting the area. U.S. strikes and interdictions of weapons and parts bound for Houthi territory, by coalition partners, have sought to degrade their operational capability. However, the Houthis' ability to adapt operationally and the ongoing development of indigenous strike capabilities, suggest they retain the potential to disrupt shipping, despite pressure from military actions and sanctions from the international community.

39. The recent PAG event, as per Annex A. has demonstrated the utility of all the different activities that EUNAVFOR ATALANTA has been leading, together with other counter-piracy forces and with the support of the shipping industry, to improve maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean. Since the initial report from Somalian security authorities to ATALANTA OHQ reporting on the departure from the shore of potential pirates, to their unsuccessful arrival ashore, the PAG was unable to hijack a vessel for ransom. The BMP MS measures applied by industry demonstrated, once again, their utility. Registration with MSCIO allowed ATALANTA to communicate direct with the Company Security Officer and the crew in the citadel, once boarded. The coordination

with partner security forces, as Seychellois Armed Forces and Japanese CTF 151 aircraft put pressure on the pirates and facilitated ATALANTA to maintain a very thorough Maritime Situational Awareness at all times, reducing the time to intervene on the attacked vessels. It also allowed to define clearly the danger area for shipping, reducing the PAG's opportunities to attack targets of opportunity. Also, CMF and TF53 contribution and flexibility to provide VIC with a Replenishment At Sea (RAS) opportunity allowed ATALANTA to maintain its presence and capability to operate for a longer period in the area. The Indian Navy, deploying INS Chennai swiftly to the scene and contributing with a very close coordination with ATALANTA at all levels to put pressure on the pirates on board ISAMOHAMDI until she entered Somali territorial waters. In summary, this event has proven the necessity of continuing with the current course of multi-national multi-agency cooperation and to sustain the counter-piracy forces pressure over Somalia as one successful hijack may trigger a new wave of piracy attacks that will be very difficult to handle.

Feedback

40. Enquiries about the content of this threat assessment should be directed to CMF and EUNAVFOR.

CMF:

Tel: 00973 1785 9629 // 00973 1785 8933
Website: www.combinedmaritimeforces.com
Email: cmf_info@me.navy.mil

EUNAVFOR ATALANTA:

Tel: 0033 (0) 298 220 220 (24/7) // 0033 (0) 298 220 170.
Website: www.mscio.eu
Email: postmaster@mscio.eu

EUNAVFOR ASPIDES:

Tel: +302410994607 (Internal 5620)
Website: www.eeas.europa.eu/eunavfor-aspides_en?
Email: cj2_acos@eleuohq.mil.gr

Annexes to this IRTA:

- A. Piracy Related Recent Events
- B. Glossary of Terms, Abbreviations and Acronyms.
- C. Lexicon.


ANNEX A

Piracy Related Recent Events



SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - 314055ISSAMOHAMDI

- On 28 October 2025, thirteen (13) Somalis hijacked the Iranian-flagged Dhow 314055ISSAMOHAMDI near Garacad area, Somalia, with eighteen (18) crew members on board.
- The Somalis formed a Pirate Action Group and used the F/V as a mother ship.
- The PAG attempted on 02 November 2025 to hijack F/V INTERTUNA TRES and on 03 November 2025 MV STOLT SAGALAND, with no success. However, the PAG managed to successfully board MT HELLAS APHRODITE on 06 November 2025 and on 07 November 2025 to unsuccessfully attempt to hijack M/V AL THUMAMA.
- Although the boarding was successful on MT HELLAS APHRODITE, the crew managed to secure themselves in the citadel and the pirates had no control of the MT or of the crew. After initial show of force from EUNAVFOR ATALANTA assets, the pirates abandoned the attack and returned to the mother ship.
- On the morning of 08 November 2025, both ESPS Victoria and INS CHENNAI (Indian warship), approached F/V ISSAMOHAMDI and put under close monitoring. When warning shots were fired by the CHENNAI, the pirates threatened to execute the Iranian hostages on-board.
- Due to the imminent risk to the hostages, no further action was carried out. The F/V subsequently set course towards the Somali coast.
- On 11 November 2025, the F/V was located by ESPS Victoria heading East. No skiff was observed as the pirates had abandoned the vessel and landed in Somalia, and after that the Iranian crew set course toward open waters.
- ESPS Victoria conducted a Friendly Approach and interviewed the crew, who confirmed that the pirates had departed the F/V earlier for the Somali coast. Following the interviews the F/V was cleared to resume her voyage without further incident.



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VESSEL: FV 'INTERTUNA TRES'
PLACE: High Seas 00-16 NL: 095-58 E
VOI: Fishing trip

STATEMENT OF FACT
 Following is the S.o.F related to 'Pirate Attack' while on fishing operation in high seas.

TIMELINE
 All local times

On: 02nd November 2025:

- 0330 hrs I took over duty from the Captain.
- 0340 hrs I observed a skiff which appeared to be Iranian origin crossing our vessel at a distance of approx. 6-7 NM. I maintained lookout and observed no suspicious movements, or any small staff launched from the Dhow. I continued to monitor the Dhow until it disappeared from sight.
- 0700 hrs, I informed my members about the observed Dhow. afterwards team members maintained lookout and alert. I acknowledge by bell for onboard alarm activated at the port.
- 0730 hrs the Iranian skiff approached us.
- 0730 hrs (local time) I observed staff approaching our vessel from the stern following the ship while I immediately instructed my team members to take up their positions, fully armed and prepared for any possible action. I maintained lookout and informed the Captain about the situation and informed the Captain and Captain about the approaching skiff. The heavy alarm immediately sounded, and all doors and hatches were secured. The ship's crew was dismissed to their stations. The crew maintained lookout and alert. The crew of the vessel (FOUR people) observed the approaching skiff based on their behavior and movement. I maintained lookout and alert. I informed the Captain about the approaching skiff and crew, I decided to take immediate defensive action I advised the Skipper to increase the vessel's speed to the maximum possible and maneuver the ship at the 0 8 cross position, providing a safe distance between the ship and the skiff. The ship maintained a safe distance and the skiff continued to approach and closed to within approximately 100 metres (before staff members opened fire). The crew maintained lookout and alert. The crew maintained lookout and alert for the ship. The position of the skiff at that time was 00° 38' -00° 50' S/ 00° 27' -00° 28' E/ 300 NM East of Somalia following the warning shots, the skiff turned and altered course towards the previously observed position. The crew maintained lookout and alert for the skiff and closed near the stern of the ship. The skiff then proceeded directly toward the Dhow. Confirming that the Dhow was coming as its MOTHER SHIP. The Dhow's position was recorded on 00° 27' 71"E

00° 38' 00"E

I hereby certify that above statement is true and correct in every aspect.

Yours faithfully,

[Signature]
 INTERTUNA LTD.
 INTERTUNA TRES



SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - FV INTERTUNA TRES

- On 02 November 2025, FV INTERTUNA TRES (Flag Seychelles) reported that a skiff was approaching at high speed. The skiff came from a mother vessel with AIS 'ISSAMOHAMADI2'. The Private Armed Security Team (PAST) on board shot 2 warnings and the skiff turned around to the mother ship.

FV INTERTUNA TRES
 Attempted boarding

28 OCT 02 NOV

FV 314055ISSAMOHAMDI
 Hijack/ Possibly Armed
 Robbery

External Action
 OHQ
 FHQ
 ATALANTA Asset

VESSEL: Stolt Sagaland

DATE: 11/11/2025

PLACE: Durban

VOI:

STATEMENT OF FACT

Following is the S.o.F related to 'Pirate Attack' while on route from Jubail to Durban 03 November 2025

Description of Event:

Location: 00 03 10N 050 31.2E

Vessel is 30Nm off coast of Mogadishu, Somalia enroute to Durban, South Africa with 3 armed guards onboard when it was approached and attacked by a white hulled skiff with 4 armed suspected pirates, pirate skiff was possibly launched from a nearby mother ship posing as an innocent "Fishing Vessel". The attack was successfully repelled by crew and armed security team.

Timing of Events:

- 0429: First Target echo detected on RADAR 3.5nm away from own ship (Later suspected as Pirate mother ship), equipped with AIS displaying as "Fishing".
- 0430: Second Small target echo (Later suspected as skiff) coming from the first echo detected but not yet approaching own ship's position.
- 0432: Second Target ARPA data shows speed 18.0 Km and CPA 1.2nm
- 0439: Second Target changed direction heading towards on ship position – approaching from our stern.
- 0439 : (the captain) was called to the bridge. I went up immediately.
- 0440: 3-man security team on the Bridge. Skiff now sighted with 4 persons onboard continuously approaching our ship's position.
- 0442: General Alarm sounded, increased ME speed to full ahead, started fire pumps 1 & 2.
- 0443: Executed evasive manoeuvre, crew mustered on deck. In this moment, bridge team and security team saw weapons in their skiffs.
- 0444: Warning shot by Security team, suspected pirates returned fire prompting our security team to fully engage to repel the attack and defend our ship.
- 0447: Distress alerts on VHF, Inmarsat-C and SSB activated. Pirate skiff less than 100m away from our ship continuing erratic manoeuvres and approaching. Ongoing exchange of gun fire between security team and pirates.
- 0450: Skiff moved away from own ship heading towards the suspected mother ship.
- 0455: All distress and SSB alerts sent were cancelled. Maintained vigilant look out with armed security team and continued voyage to Durban, South Africa.

I hereby certify that above statement is true and correct in every aspect.

Yours faithfully,

Capt. Maxim Driga

M/T Stolt Sagaland

[Signature]
 STOLT SAGALAND
 M/T 314055
 M/T NO 1021
 M/T NO 1022
 CALL SIGN ZC71V

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - MV STOLT SAGALAND

- On 03 Nov 2025, MV STOLT SAGALAND (Flag Cayman) reported a skiff attempted to board the vessel with 4 persons on it. There was a mother vessel 5NM from their position. People from skiff shot several rounds and PAST on board shot back to them. Small craft quit the attempt of boarding. The mother dhow was identified to be ISSAMOHAMDI.



FV INTERTUNA TRES
 Attempted boarding

28 OCT 02 NOV 03 NOV

FV 314055ISSAMOHAMDI
 Hijack/ Possibly Armed
 Robbery


MV STOLT SAGALAND
 Attempted boarding

External Action
 OHQ
 FHQ
 ATALANTA Asset


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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - MT HELLAS APHRODITE



- On 06 Nov 2025 MT HELLAS APHRODITE (Flag Malta) was under attack by armed pirates using small-caliber weapons and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs). The crew of the tanker immediately sought refuge inside the ship's citadel. The pirates attempted to breach the citadel, but were unsuccessful.
- VIC closed distance to the scene, she launched SOMBRA aerial surveillance asset which successfully identified the dhow ISSAMOHAMDI with a skiff in tow. Imagery confirmed the presence of approximately thirteen (13) armed individuals on the dhow, along with Iranian crew members.
- On 07 Nov, EUNAVFOR ATALANTA assets launched a boarding operation (citadel) by the SOMTU to MT HELLAS APHRODITE. The SOMTU was inserted by fast rope on the M/T while two Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs) simultaneously approached the vessel from both sides. The operation was closely monitored in real time from VIC and OHQ via SOMBRA reconnaissance camera.
- The crew of the M/T HELLAS APHRODITE was successfully rescued from the citadel and found safe and sound. A thorough inspection of the vessel was conducted by the SOMTU and evidence of the pirates activities were collected. (Crew statements and findings in slides below).



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Vessel : Al Thumama
Place : Somali Basin
Voy. No. : QG-THM-075

Date: 10 November 2023

STATEMENT OF FACT

Following is the S.o.F related to Pirate Attack while en route from Ras Laffan, Qatar to Swinoujcie, Poland

<TIMELINE>


I hereby certify that above statement is true and correct in every respect.

Yours faithfully,



SEQUENCE OF EVENTS MV AL THUMAMA

- On 07 Nov 2025 MV AL THUMAMA (Flag Marshall Islands) was approached by a skiff with 3 Persons on Board. The vessel increased speed and avoided the skiff which retreated towards its mother vessel, which was positively identified as the F/V 314055ISSAMOHAMI.



FV INTERTUNA TRES
Attempted boarding

MT HELLAS APHRODITE
was BOARDING by PAG.

EUNAVFOR OP.
ATALANTA liberated the
crew of MT Hellas
Aphrodite.

28 OCT

02 NOV

03 NOV

06 NOV

07 NOV

FV 314055ISSAMOHAMDI
**Hijack/ Possibly Armed
Robbery**

MV STOLT SAGALAND
Attempted boarding

MV AL THUMAMA
Suspicious Approach by
FV 314055ISSAMOHAMDI

- External Action
- OHQ
- FHQ
- ATALANTA Asset

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ANNEX B

Glossary of Terms, Abbreviations and Acronyms

AaS	Ansar al-Sunna: Terrorist Group operating in Mozambique
AG	Arabian Gulf
AOO	Area of Operation
AOR	Area of Responsibility
AQAP	Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
AS	Arabian Sea
AS	Al Shabaab: Terrorist Group operating in Somalia
ASBM	Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile
ASCM	Anti-Ship Cruise Missile
ATMIS	African union Transition Mission in Somalia
BAM	Bab-al-Mandeb strait
BMP5	Best Management Practice (Version 5): IMO and industry sponsored suggested planning and operational practices for ship operators and Masters of ships transiting the Indian Ocean
BM	Ballistic Missile
CMF	Combined Maritime Forces: 38 nation multi-national maritime force operating in Indian Ocean, Red Sea, Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and Gulf of Aden.
COA	Course Of Action
CRS	Central Red Sea
CTF	Combined Task Force
EMASOH	European Maritime Awareness Operation in the Strait of Hormuz
EU NAVFOR	European Union Naval Force Somalia (Operation ATALANTA)
FO	Focused Operation
FV	Fishing Vessel
GOA	Gulf of Aden
GOO	Gulf of Oman
HOA	Horn Of Africa
HQ	Headquarters

HRA	High Risk Area: Industry defined area where it is considered there is a higher risk of piracy and within which self-protective measures are most likely to be required
IMB	International Maritime Bureau
IMSC	International Maritime Security Construct
ICOD	Intelligence Cut-off Date
IOT	In Order To
IRTA	Industry Releasable Threat Assessment
IRTB	Industry Releasable Threat Bulletin
IRTC	Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor
IUU	Illegal Unreported and Unregulated
IS	Islamic State
Kts	Knots
KSA	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
MOU	Memorandum Of Understanding
MSCHOA	Maritime Security Centre (Horn of Africa): The maritime industry control centre for the EU's Op ATALANTA.
MSO	Maritime Security Operation
MSTC	Maritime Security Transit Corridor
MT	Motor Tanker
MV	Merchant Vessel
NM	Nautical Mile
NRS	North Red Sea
OSINT	Open Source Intelligence
PAG	Pirate Action Group
PAST	Private Armed Security Team
PCASP	Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel
POB	Persons on Board
RS	Red Sea
SBM	Single Buoy Mooring
SLC	Saudi-Led Coalition
SNA	the Somali National Army

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SRS	South Red Sea
SSF	Somali Security Force
STC	Southern Transitional Council
SV	Sailing Vessel
TTPs	Tactics, Techniques And Procedures
TTW	Territorial Waters
UAS	Unmanned Aerial System
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UKMCC	United Kingdom Maritime Component Commander
UKMTO	United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (Based in Dubai)
USV	Unmanned Surface Vehicle
VRA	Vessel Registration Area
WBIED	Water Borne Improvised Explosive Device
WIO	Western Indian Ocean
WFP	World Food Programme

ANNEX C

Lexicon

Category	Industry Definition	EUNAVFOR ATALANTA Additional Considerations
Attack	Aggressive approach with weapons discharged.	Conflict-related: The threat of or the use of violence related to conflict or conflict spillover.
Attempted Boarding	Close approach with visible boarding paraphernalia, thwarted by defensive measures.	No additional categorization
Boarding	Boarding with intent to steal or harm without taking control.	No additional categorization
Hijack	Attackers take control of a ship against the crew's will for purposes such as robbery, cargo theft, or kidnapping.	No additional categorization
Piracy	As per UNCLOS Article 101: - Illegal acts on high seas - Against ship/persons outside state jurisdiction - Operating pirate vessel - Facilitating such acts	No additional categorization

Category	Industry Definition	EUNAVFOR ATALANTA Additional Considerations
Armed Robbery	As per IMO Resolution A.1025(26): Acts within state waters, including violence/detention/dpredation.	No additional categorization
Suspicious Activity	Unaccountable actions including: - Unusual crew numbers - CPA considerations - Unusual equipment - Multiple skiffs - Unusual vessel type - High-speed operations - Unmanned appearance	No additional categorization
Other Crimes in the Maritime Environment	Basic categorization: 1. Sea theft (without violence) 2. Sea robbery (with violence/arms)	Expands categories to include: 1. Kidnap 2. Human Trafficking 3. Sea Theft/Robbery 4. Smuggling (Human, weapons, narcotics, cargo) 5. IUU Fishing 6. Maritime Pollution 7. Sabotage 8. Cyber Attacks 9. Underwater Cable Tampering 10. Other (disputes, harassment)

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