



## Industry Releasable Threat Bulletin (IRTB) 055

Issued: 25 May 2026

Latest IRTA 16 Dec 25



**For General Use.** This threat bulletin has been released to the Shipping Industry.

1. **Foreword.** This Industry Releasable Threat Bulletin (IRTB) has been written in coordination between Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) ATALANTA. It is intended to help shipping operators who are responsible for merchant and large commercial fishing vessels that pass through or operate in the Western Indian Ocean, Gulf of Oman, Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
2. **Purpose.** The purpose of an IRTB is to bring specific incidents or threats to the attention of the shipping industry. In this case there are updates on the following IRTBs:
3. **Incident.**
  - Event 1 – Attempted Boarding
  - Event 2 – Attempted Boarding
  - Event 3 – Attempted Boarding
  - Event 4 – Attempted Boarding
4. **Date.**
  - Event 1 – 230215Z MAY 26
  - Event 2 – 230325Z MAY 26
  - Event 3 – 230728Z MAY 26
  - Event 4 – 231100Z MAY 26
5. **Location (See Fig.1)**
  - Event 1 - The incident took place IVO of 13-33N 050-28E
  - Event 2– The incident took place IVO of 13-33N 050-28E
  - Event 3 - The incident took place ~13NM West of 13-33N 050-28E
  - Event 4 - The incident took place IVO of 12-38N 050-00E




Fig.1

## 6. Incident Description

Event 1 – On 23 May 26 0215Z, MT reported that they were approached and followed by 1 skiff with approx. 5-8 POB. The MT implemented BMP and PAST and attackers aborted their approach.

Event 2 - On 23 May 26 0325Z, MT reported that they were approached and followed by 1 skiff with same description of that in Event 1. The MT implemented BMP and PAST and attackers aborted their approach.

Event 3 – On 23 May 26 0728Z, MT reported that they were approached and followed by 1 skiff with same description of that in Event 1 and Event 2. The MT implemented BMP and PAST and attackers aborted their approach.

Event 4 - On 23 May 26 1100Z, CD reported that they were approached and followed by 1 skiff with 7 POB armed with same description of that in Events 1, 2 and 3. The Indian Navy intercepted the skiff and aborted their approach returning back to Somalia.

Operation ATALANTA assets have confirmed that the PAG on board the skiff related to the aforementioned 4 Events has been successfully disrupted by an Indian Naval warship and is no longer considered a threat to vessels operating in the area.

## 7. Assessment. Preliminary indicators suggest these incidents were performed by a single PAG stemming from the North coasts of Somalia focusing against a loaded oil tanker in

the IRTC. As the attempts were unsuccessful, it was probable that the same PAG tried opportunistically to hijack a dhow with the purpose either to be used as a mothership to facilitate subsequent piracy operations or just for a ransom. As the weather is still favorable for PAG activities in the IRTC, the TA for piracy is as described on para 10.

8. **Recommendations.** Vessels are requested to remain vigilant and to adhere to BMP – Maritime Security when transiting the Western Indian Ocean and the Somali waters. While these waters are routinely patrolled by CMF, EUNAVFOR ATALANTA and other warships, the timely and comprehensive reporting of incidents and suspicious activity remains crucial to allow for a rapid incident response. We request that, where possible, and without endangering the vessel or crew, vessels obtain and report as much factual details as possible of incidents and suspicious activity to include logs, photographs, video, and radar footage. CSO's and masters are strongly recommended to register their vessels with MSCIO when entering the Voluntary Reporting Area, and to report any incidents to UKMTO in accordance with BMP Maritime Security. This will enable a more rapid response to incidents and allow CMF and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA to monitor activity, enabling the most effective allocation of resources. CSOs are recommended to gather information on known Pattern of Life and Maritime Situation Awareness along the intended route and ports of call when conducting risk assessments for their fleets.

9. **Threat Assessment for Piracy**



THREAT ASSESSMENT	BENIGN	LOW	MODERATE	SUBSTANTIAL	SEVERE	CRITICAL
YARDSTICK	An attack is <b>HIGHLY UNLIKELY</b> (10% - 20%)	An attack is <b>UNLIKELY</b> (>25% - 35%)	An attack is a <b>REALISTIC POSSIBILITY</b> (40% - <50%)	An attack is <b>LIKELY / PROBABLE</b> (55% - <75%)	An attack is <b>HIGHLY LIKELY</b> (80% - 90%)	An attack is <b>ALMOST CERTAIN</b> (>95%)

10. **Publication.**

- a. Produced by CMF and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA.
- b. Published by MSCIO.

11. **Feedback.** Enquiries about the content of this bulletin should be directed to EUNAVFOR ATALANTA;

**EUNAVFOR ATALANTA:**

- (1) **Tel:** 0033 (0) 298 220 220 // 0033 298 220 170.
- (2) **Website:** [www.mscio.eu](http://www.mscio.eu)
- (3) **Email:** [postmaster@mscio.eu](mailto:postmaster@mscio.eu)
  
- (4) **CMF:**
- (5) **Tel:** 813 439 3523 / 813 529 3831
- (6) **Website:** [www.combinedmaritimeforces.com](http://www.combinedmaritimeforces.com)
- (7) **Email:** [UKMCC-BWCGroup@mod.gov.uk](mailto:UKMCC-BWCGroup@mod.gov.uk)