Industry Releasable Threat Bulletin (IRTB) 058
Issued: 3 JUL 26

For General Use. This threat bulletin has been released to the Shipping Industry.

1. **Foreword**. This Industry Releasable Threat Bulletin (IRTB) has been written in coordination between European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) ATALANTA and Combined Maritime Forces (CMF).

   It is intended to help shipping operators who are responsible for merchant and large commercial fishing vessels that navigate or operate in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Oman.

2. **Purpose.** The purpose of an IRTB is to bring specific incidents or threats to the attention of the shipping industry.

3. **Incidents.**

   Event 1. Gulf of Aden, IRTC. MV. Boarding
   Event 2. Gulf of Aden, IRTC. MV JAL KISAN (IMO 9223851, Flag LIBERIA). Suspicious approach

4. **Date / Time.**
   Event 1 010715Z JUL 26.
   Event 2 010945Z JUL 26.

5. **Location (Fig 1.).**

   Event 1 took place on the IRTC in the Gulf of Aden, position 12-47N 048-02E.
   Event 2 took place on the IRTC in the Gulf of Aden, position 12-36N 048-14E.

Figure 1 IRTB 058 Events location

6. **Incidents Description**

Event 1: On 01 JUL 26 0715Z, a MV reported that she was approached by a skiff carrying armed persons on board and possible RPG. The armed persons boarded the MV. The Master reported that the crew had implemented Best Management Practices for Maritime Security (BMP-MS), stopped the vessel, activated the distress alert, switched on AIS, and gathered all crew in the citadel so the assailants did not take control of the vessel.

After EUNAVFOR ATALANTA coordination, with South Korean and Indian Navy warships in the area, Indian Navy boarding team subsequently secured MV, confirmed that no pirates were onboard, and enabled the crew to leave the citadel safely. No injuries were reported.

Event 2: On 01 JUL 26 1147Z, on the IRTC in the Gulf of Aden, MV JAL KISAN reported having been approached by a skiff with four people on board. MV JAL KISAN implemented BMP increasing speed and showing the PAST on board, then the skiff altered course and MV JAL KISAN resumed her route to next port of call.

7. **Assessment.** Indicators suggest this incident was performed by a single Pirate Action Group (PAG) stemming from the North coasts of Somalia. It is HIGHLY LIKELY that the PAG that boarded the MV, not been able to take control of the ship, inflicted damaged on her and then proceeded to another target, that was the MV JAL KISAN receiving a suspicious approach few hours later. As the weather is still favorable for PAG activities, the TA for piracy is as described on para 9.

8. **Recommendations.** Vessels are requested to remain vigilant and to adhere to BMP – Maritime Security when transiting the Western Indian Ocean and the Somali waters. While these waters are routinely patrolled by EUNAVFOR ATALANTA, CMF and other warships, the timely and comprehensive reporting of incidents and suspicious activity remains crucial to allow for a rapid incident response.

We request that, where possible, and without endangering the vessel or crew, vessels obtain and report as much factual details as possible of incidents and suspicious activity to include logs, photographs, video, and radar footage. CSO's and masters are strongly recommended to register their vessels with MSCIO when entering the Voluntary Reporting Area, and to report any incidents to MSCIO and UKMTO in accordance with BMP Maritime Security.

This will enable a more rapid response to incidents and allow EUNAVFOR ATALANTA and CMF to monitor activity, enabling the most effective allocation of resources. CSOs are recommended to gather information on known Pattern of Life and Maritime Situation Awareness along the intended route and ports of call when conducting risk assessments for their fleets.

9. **Threat Assessment for Piracy**



Point	Ref Coordinates
A	09-00N 51-02E
B	03-40N 47-43E
C	02-00N 50-00E
D	08-00N 54-00E
E	15-20N 51-38E
F	12-41N 43-27E
G	12-33N 43-13E
H	12-09N 51-39E

10. **Publication.**

a. Produced by CMF and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA.
b. Published by MSCIO.

THREAT ASSESSMENT	BENIGN	LOW	MODERATE	SUBSTANTIAL	SEVERE	CRITICAL
YARDSTICK	An attack is **HIGHLY UNLIKELY** (10% – 20%)	An attack is **UNLIKELY** (>25% – 35%)	An attack is a **REALISTIC POSSIBILITY** (40% – <50%)	An attack is **LIKELY / PROBABLE** (55% – <75%)	An attack is **HIGHLY LIKELY** (80% – 90%)	An attack is **ALMOST CERTAIN** (>95%)

11. **Feedback.** Enquiries about the content of this bulletin should be directed to EUNAVFOR ATALANTA;

EUNAVFOR ATALANTA:

(1) **Tel:** 0033 (0) 298 220 220 // 0033 298 220 170.
(2) **Website:** www.mscio.eu
(3) **Email:** postmaster@mscio.eu

(4) **CMF:**
(5) **Tel**: 813 439 3523 / 813 529 3831
(6) **Website**: www.combinedmaritimeforces.com
(7) **Email:** UKMCC-BWCGroup@mod.gov.uk