




MSCIO ATALANTA WEEKLY REPORT

03rd Apr – 09th Apr

 postmaster@mscio.eu


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OVERVIEW OF INCIDENTS IN THE VOLUNTARY REPORTING AREA (VRA)




CATEGORY		No.	Page Ref.
	Armed Robbery	Nil	NSTR
	Attack	1	Slide 3
	Attempted Boarding	Nil	NSTR
	Boarding	Nil	NSTR
	Hijack	Nil	NSTR
	Kidnap	Nil	NSTR
	Piracy	2	Slide 6 Slide 7
	Suspicious Activity	1	Slide 3
	Other Maritime Crimes	Nil	NSTR
Total Incidents		4	



OVERVIEW OF INCIDENTS IN THE AS/SoH/GoO



EVENTS FROM 03-09APR			
NUMBER	DATE	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION
30	07APR	26-12N 053-42E	A container ship has reportedly been struck by an unknown projectile approximately 25 NM southwest of Kish Island (Iran), resulting in damage above the waterline. The crew is reported safe.
29	05APR	KHOR FAKKAN PORT	A merchant vessel has reported several projectiles impacting in close proximity while alongside at Khor Fakkan Port (UAE).



More detailed information can be found in:
[MSCIO EU | Advisories](#)



ASSESSMENT AND GUIDANCE FOR AS/SoH/GoO



- Military operations are expected to be on hold following the agreement of a two-week ceasefire period, and vessels may begin to resume transits through the Strait of Hormuz in the near term. However, the conditions under which the Strait will reopen remain uncertain, and no formal procedures have been established at this stage.
- Due to the prevailing uncertainty, transit through the Strait of Hormuz remains NOT recommended until an appropriate and safe mechanism is formally defined by the relevant authorities.
- GNSS/AIS spoofing levels inside the Arabian Gulf, SoH and Gulf of Oman have decreased, however, intermittent disruptions are still reported.
- It is advised for merchant vessels to:
 - ✓ Avoid transiting the Strait of Hormuz until safe and coordinated framework for transit has been established by the relevant authorities.
 - ✓ Adhere to guidance issued by their Flag State or competent national authorities when considering transit.
 - ✓ Perform enhanced risk assessment.
 - ✓ Strictly adhere to BMP-MS.
 - ✓ Monitor Ch16 VHF and be prepared to be hailed.
 - ✓ Use AIS as per company policy.
 - ✓ Whenever possible, increase distance from any naval forces to mitigate risk.
 - ✓ Enhance radar and landmark procedures to support safe navigation, since GNSS are likely to be unreliable.
 - ✓ Be prepared to rely on dead-reckoning navigation.



ASSESSMENT AND GUIDANCE FOR RED SEA/BeM

- Despite the current ceasefire agreement, the potential for the resumption of hostile activity by Iranian-aligned Houthi forces against commercial shipping in the Red Sea and adjacent approaches remains active.
- Currently, no Houthi attacks have been reported in the maritime domain.
- Merchant vessels should expect:
 - Higher exposure for vessels with certain affiliations.
 - Potential delays for vessels requesting close protection.
- It is advised for merchant vessels to:
 - Maintain navigation through international waters for as long as possible.
 - Navigate closer to the African coastline where feasible.
 - Maintain coordination with maritime security reporting centers, both MSCIO and UKMTO.
 - Conduct a voyage-specific risk assessment and adhere to BMP-MS.
 - Before transiting the area, take into consideration any direct or indirect affiliations between the vessel, its ownership, or its cargo and countries of interest.
- Reports indicate GNSS/GPS disruption in the central Red Sea. Vessels may experience degradation or loss of satellite navigation signals. Masters are advised to exercise caution and verify position using alternative navigation methods.

1.1. TYPE OF INCIDENT: PIRACY.

1.2. PERIOD: FM 24TH MAR 0700 UTC – 06TH APR.

1.3. LOCATION: 350NM NE Mogadishu, Somalia.

2. VESSELS DETAILS.

Fishing vessel - Iranian type dhow named “AL WASEEMI 786”.

3. RELEVANT INFORMATION RELATED WITH THE EVENT.

A pirate action group (PAG), hijacked an Iranian-flagged fishing vessel (dhow) named “AL WASEEMI 786”, approximately 400NM East of Mogadishu.

Preliminary indicators suggested the incident as an opportunistic hijacking intended to repurpose the dhow as a mothership to facilitate subsequent piracy operations.

EUNAVFOR ATALANTA located the dhow while it was transiting through the Somali Basin and closely monitored her, effectively preventing its use in further piracy activities.


Subsequently, **EUNAVFOR ATALANTA, in close coordination with Somali authorities, disrupted the PAG, resulting in the release of the hijacked dhow.**

More information available in the following links:

MSCIO:

[MSC IO | Alerts](#)

[MSC IO | IRTB Industry Releasable Threat Bulletin](#)



- 1.1. TYPE OF INCIDENT: PIRACY.
- 1.2. PERIOD: FM 08TH APR - ONGOING.
- 1.3. LOCATION: Horn of Africa, Somalia.

2. VESSELS DETAILS.

Iranian Jelbut dhow with one skiff.

3. RELEVANT INFORMATION RELATED WITH THE EVENT.

A dhow has reportedly been hijacked by a Probable Pirate Action Group (PAG) in the vicinity of Bargal, northern Somalia (Horn of Africa). The vessel is assessed to be highly likely used as a mothership.

The PAG is reportedly wearing militar uniforms and conducting VHF calls to vessels. Any vessel receiving suspicious VHF calls while transiting the area is encouraged to report immediately to MSCIO.

OP ATALANTA has located the dhow and is monitoring the situation.


Vessels operating in the area are strongly advised to exercise caution when transiting close to the Horn of Africa.

Masters are encouraged to maintain enhanced vigilance, implement BMP-MS measures, and report any suspicious activity immediately to MSCIO and UKMTO.

More information available in the following links:

MSCIO:

[MSCIO | Alerts](#)





MARITIME SECURITY EVENTS RELATED TO PIRACY (STATUS AND DETAILED DESCRIPTION FROM JAN 2026)




No	Date	Name	MSE Category	Last info.
54	31 DEC	FV LIAO DONG YU 578	Armed Robbery	Armed robbery reported off the coast of Banderbeyla (Bari Region). PSP has informed that the Vessel has been released near Ceel Dhidar, Bandarbeyla district. According to local credible sources, a ransom of 1.2 USD was paid.
55	02 JAN	FV SULTANA 2	Hijack	Alert on IORIS from PMPF. Dhow located off Al- Nushayah. All passengers disembarked. 13JAN Yemen Coast Guard confirmed. RESOLVED after agreement with the vessel's owner. Dhow and crew RELEASED
56	03 FEB	FV AL-WALEED	Armed Robbery	Received a report from Yemen CG on 03 Feb, that a group of 4 armed men captured a Yemeni 8 meter boat (blue hull) on the coast of Hafun. One fisherman was on board during the capture but was later released. The boat is allegedly taken to Dudura coast. Boat size and engine are not coherent with piracy TTP. Event still pending further investigation.
57	26 FEB	UNKNOWN	Piracy Attack	PMPF has reported that two skiffs attempted attacking an Iranian flagged vessel. The vessels defensive actions prevented the boarding. One attacker reportedly killed and two injured. Initial information from LNO MOG and Puntland police, the PAG composition is 9 pirates. PMPF has also allegedly arrested 3 pirates and taken in custody 1 of the 2 skiffs.
58	24 MAR	AL WASEEMI 786	Pirated	Received a report that Iranian dhow "AL WASEEMI 786" with 24 crew members was pirated on the 19 of March aprox 400nm from Mogadishu. The PAG group consisting of a number between 10 and 15 pirates. No injuries reported.

● Solved or closed cases ● Active cases




PIRACY STATISTICS (NOV 2023 – APR 2026)

PIRACY RELATED EVENTS FROM NOV 2023 (58)




PIRACY RELATED EVENTS FROM 2008



- SUSPICIOUS APPROACH**
 - Sudden changes of course towards the ship and aggressive behavior. CPA inside 1nm with clear intention to attack and/or weapons clearly displayed.
- ATTEMPTED BOARDING**
 - An Act where the PAG failed to get onboard and gain control of the vessel or members of the crew. Boarding paraphernalia were employed or visible in the approach.
- BOARDING**
 - A boarding in which the attackers have boarded the ship but have NOT taken control.
- PIRACY ATTACK/ ARMED ROBBERY ATTEMPT**
 - Ship has been subject to an aggressive approach by unidentified craft and weapons have been discharged. Also, paraphernalia/ tripwires related to piracy, hooks, ladders ect have been reported.
- HIJACK**
 - Attackers have illegally boarded and taken control of a vessel at the high seas against the crew's will.
- PIRATED**
 - A pirated vessel is a vessel subject to an act that falls under the UNCLOS Article 101 definition of piracy.
- ARMED ROBBERY AT SEA**
 - Any illegal act of violence or detention within a state's internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial seas.

PIRACY ASSESSMENT



It is **ALMOST CERTAIN** that the PAG's tactics for conducting piracy on the high seas involve hijacking a dhow and using it as a mother ship. The pirates then blend in with the usual traffic and deploy skiffs from the mother ship to attack vessels. They are able to navigate to the high seas, with evidence of events up to up to 600 nautical miles off the East Somali coast.

Nevertheless, from November 2024 it is becoming increasingly common for a group of people to organise themselves, identify a vulnerable ship close to the coast and use skiffs to carry out an attack. These attacks typically target Yemeni fishing dhows. While there is no confirmed information, it is **HIGHLY LIKELY** that ransoms would have been paid.

On the other hand, that risk could be amplified if local fishermen turn into pirates as a consequence that no effective action is being taken from the authorities to safeguard Somali TTW from IUUF.


It is **ALMOST CERTAIN** that the ransom paid for the LIAO DONG YU will set a bad example for other pirate groups trying to imitate that operation.

PIRACY ASSESSMENT

The PIRACY Threat Assessment (TA) is determined as:

MODERATE off the coast of MUDUG, NUGAAL, Northern and South-eastern BARI, as well as Northern ERIGAVO and LAAS KHOREY Districts.

LOW in the remaining areas.



THREAT ASSESSMENT	BENIGN	LOW	MODERATE	SUBSTANTIAL	SEVERE	CRITICAL
YARDSTICK	An attack is HIGHLY UNLIKELY (10% – 20%)	An attack is UNLIKELY (>25% – 35%)	An attack is a REALISTIC POSSIBILITY (40% – <50%)	An attack is LIKELY / PROBABLE (55% – <75%)	An attack is HIGHLY LIKELY (80% – 90%)	An attack is ALMOST CERTAIN (>95%)

MARITIME SECURITY CENTRE INDIAN OCEAN (MSCIO)

VOLUNTARY REPORTING THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE



WHY TO REPORT

- Improve Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA)
- Enable rapid information-sharing and coordination.
- Support vessels in High Risk Areas.
- Contribute to collective maritime security efforts.

WHAT TO REPORT

- Entry into the Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA).
- Daily position updates.
- Exit from the VRA or arrival at a safe port.
- Suspicious activity or incidents.
- Attacks, attempted or successful.

HOW TO REPORT

- Online: www.mscio.eu
- Email: postmaster@mscio.eu
- Copy UKMTO: watchkeepers@ukmto.com

BENEFITS OF REPORTING

- IMPROVED MONITORING AND PROTECTION DURING TRANSIT -
- ACCESS TO TIMELY THREAT ASSESSMENTS AND SECURITY ALERTS -
- ENHANCED COORDINATION WITH NAVAL FORCES OPERATING IN THE REGION -

Your report strengthens maritime security across the Indian Ocean and Red Sea



REGISTRATION AND REPORTING

REGISTRATION AND REPORTING.

CSO's and Masters are encouraged to register their vessels upon entering the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area with both:

- MSCIO (<https://mscio.eu/reporting/vessel-registration/>)
- UKMTO (<https://www.ukmto.org/reporting-formats/initial-report>)

And to report all incidents to UKMTO and MSCIO.

When safe to do so, vessels should document incidents and suspicious activity through logs, photographs, video, and radar footage. CSOs should gather information on Pattern of Life and Maritime Situational Awareness for their planned routes and ports of call to support risk assessments. These procedures enable effective monitoring and resource allocation by CMF and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA.

Contact Information (MSCIO):

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