





MSCIO ATALANTA WEEKLY REPORT

04 Jul – 10 Jul

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OVERVIEW OF INCIDENTS IN THE VOLUNTARY REPORTING AREA (VRA)



CATEGORY	No.	Page Ref.
Armed Robbery	Nil	NSTR
Attack	2	2 and 3
Attempted Boarding	Nil	NSTR
Boarding	Nil	NSTR
Hijack	Nil	NSTR
Kidnap	Nil	NSTR
Piracy	Nil	NSTR
Suspicious Activity	Nil	NSTR
Other Maritime Crimes	1	4
Total Incidents	3 (Note 1)	

Note 1: The events described in page 4 are considered as a whole since they are consecutive reports related with GNSS interferences affecting to the same area since 03 Jul to 10 Jul 25.



ATTACK

1. SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS IN THE VRA.

1.1 TYPE OF INCIDENT: ATTACK.

1.2 NAME OF THE SHIP: M/V MAGIC SEAS (IMO 9603611).

1.3 DATE AND ATTACK LOCATION: 06 JUL 2025. The Red Sea. 14 28N 042 03E.

1.4.1 LAST POSITION REPORTED: 1457N - 04139E.

2. RELEVANT INFORMATION RELATED TO THE ATTACK.

During the morning of the 6th of Jul, UKMTO has reported that the M/V Magic Seas was being attacked by, at least, 8 small boats and USV (Unmanned Surface Vessel). The first report pointed out that small weapons and RPG (Rocket Propelled Grenades) were being used by attackers. Subsequent reports confirmed the impact of at least one missile. After having evaluated the damage on board, the crew abandoned the ship in the position stated in point 1.4. The crew of the M/V Magic Seas was recovered and disembarked in Djibouti port by the M/V Safeen Prism. No casualties were reported.

In accordance with open sources, it is known that the ship was sunk.

3. MORE INFO AVAILABLE ON THE FOLLOWING LINKS:

UKMTO: [20250708-UKMTO WARNING INCIDENT 027-25-UPDATE 002.pdf](#)

[20250711 UKMTO Summary Report-11July25 \(2\).pdf](#)

JMIC: [117-jmic-information-note- 07-july 2025.pdf](#) MSC IO | [Weekly Threat Assessment](#)

MSCIO: [MSC IO | Alerts](#)

[Microsoft Word - 20250708 ASPIDES recommendations](#)

4. MSCIO utterly recommend to Seafarers to read the guidance exposed in the followings documents:

JMIC: [117-jmic-information-note- 07-july 2025.pdf](#) MSC IO | [Weekly Threat Assessment](#)

MSCIO: [20250708 ASPIDES advisory message to companies.pdf](#)



Attack location  1401UTC 06 JUL 25

Last location reported  1541UTC 06 JUL 25



ATTACK

1. SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS IN THE VRA.

1.1 TYPE OF INCIDENT: ATTACK.

1.2 NAME OF THE SHIP: M/V ETERNITY C (IMO 9588249).

1.3 DATE AND ATTACK LOCATION: 07 JUL 2025. The Red Sea. 14 26N 042 08E.

1.4.1 LAST POSITION REPORTED: 14 42N 042 46E.

2. RELEVANT INFORMATION RELATED TO THE ATTACK.

During the afternoon of the 7th of Jul, UKMTO was reported that the M/V ETERNITY C was being attacked by multiple small crafts fitted with RPG (Rocket Propelled Grenades).

Due to the damages caused by the attack, M/V ETERNITY lost propulsion. During the period that the attack was ongoing, M/V ETERNITY could report through VHF that there had been injuries on board.

Subsequent reports confirmed that M/V ETERNITY C had suffered major damages.

On the 8th of Jul, ETERNITY C was reported to be sunk in position 14 42,52N 042 46,21E. At the time of ending this Weekly Report, a SOLAS operation leading by M/V AL BAHIA (9097185) is ongoing (read [NAVWARN 333/25 DTG 091615Z](#)). [hydrography.paknavy.gov.pk/wp-content/plugins/navarea-warnings/custom_uploaded_warnings_for_navarea/20250709SEC 333.txt](https://hydrography.paknavy.gov.pk/wp-content/plugins/navarea-warnings/custom_uploaded_warnings_for_navarea/20250709SEC_333.txt)

3. MORE INFO AVAILABLE IN THE FOLLOWING LINKS:

UKMTO: [20250709-UKMTO WARNING INCIDENT 027-25-UPDATE 004 \(2\).pdf](#)

[20250711 UKMTO Summary Report-11July25 \(2\).pdf](#)

JMIC: [118 JMIC Information Note 08 JULY 2025.pdf](#)

MSCIO: [MSC IO | Alerts](#)

[Microsoft Word - 20250709 ASPIDES advisory message to companies](#)

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JMIC: [118 JMIC Information Note 08 JULY 2025.pdf](#)

MSCIO: [20250708 ASPIDES advisory message to companies.pdf](#)



Attack location  1634UTC 07 JUL 25


Sunk location  1213UTC 09 JUL 25



OTHER MARITIME CRIMES

1. SUMMARY OF THE GNSS EVENTS REGISTERED IN MSCIO FROM 12 JUN TO 10 JUL 2025.


In the map showed on the right side, a summary of all the events related with GNSS interferences happened during the last three weeks can be consulted.



Statistic above shows a sharp decrease in the GNSS interferences report since 24 JUN. However, last reports suggest a smooth increase during the last week. Although it seems that GNSS interferences could be reaching a level as it was before the conflict in the area (The Persian Gulf, The Arabian Sea and SoH), the reports continue showing that the effects are noticed in an extensive area.

More info: [20250711 UKMTO Summary Report-11July25 \(2\).pdf](#)

More info about virtual threats: [bmp-ms-2025-final-hi-res.pdf](#)



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RELEASABLE TO SHIPPING INDUSTRY
WEEK 04TH JUL – 10TH JUL 2025

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LAST PIRACY RELATED EVENTS (STATUS AND DETAILED DESCRIPTION)

No	Date	Name	MSE Category	Last info
45	7 FEB	FV AL NAJMA	Armed Robbery	Reported hijacked dhow ivo EYL. 6 hijackers. On 12 Feb, the hijackers left the dhow. No information of any ransom paid was confirmed
46	15 FEB	FV SAYTUUN 2	Armed Robbery	Reported hijacked vessel ivo EYL. 6 hijackers. On 22 Feb, the hijackers, after stealing the crew's belongings, abandoned the dhow. A ransom has been paid
47	16 MAR	FV AL HIDAYA	Armed Robbery	Hijack reported off the coast of "DURDURA" South of XAFUN - 5 hijackers.

Locations of the events 45, 46 and 47 are marked with  in pag 7.

 Solved or closed cases


 Active cases

 Unsolved cases




PIRACY STATISTICS (NOV 2023 – JUL 2025)

47 Events



7/4/2025 | 2

MARITIME SECURITY EVENTS



Pirated (Outside TITW) / Armed Robbery at sea (Inside TITW)

•PAG takes control of the ship and requests a ransom

Piracy Attack

•PAG unsuccessful attack on ship

Hijack

•Attackers boarded and taken control of a ship against the crew's will

Boarding

•Successful attack but pirates do not take control

Suspicious Approach

•Suspicious maneuvering with clear intentions to attack. (weapons clearly displayed)

Providing maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean




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PIRACY SITUATION (NOV 2023 – JUL 2025)



PIRACY ASSESSMENT

It is **ALMOST CERTAIN** that the PAGs (Pirate Action Groups) tactics for conducting piracy on the high seas involve hijacking a dhow and using it as a mother ship. The pirates then blend in with the usual traffic and deploy skiffs from the mother ship to attack vessels. They are able to navigate up to 600 nautical miles or more off the East Somali coast.

(U) Nevertheless, from November 2024 it is becoming increasingly common for a group of people to organise themselves, identify a vulnerable ship close to the coast and use skiffs to carry out an attack. These attacks typically target Yemeni fishing dhows. While there is no confirmed information, it is **HIGHLY LIKELY** that ransoms would have been paid.

On the other hand, that risk could be amplified if local fishermen turn into pirates as a consequence that no effective action is being taken from the authorities to safeguard the Somali TTW from IUU (Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated) fishing.

THREAT ASSESSMENT	BENIGN	LOW	MODERATE	SUBSTANTIAL	SEVERE	CRITICAL
YARDSTICK	An attack is HIGHLY UNLIKELY (10% – 20%)	An attack is UNLIKELY (25% – 35%)	An attack is a REALISTIC POSSIBILITY (40% – 50%)	An attack is LIKELY / PROBABLE (55% – 75%)	An attack is HIGHLY LIKELY (80% – 90%)	An attack is ALMOST CERTAIN (95%+)



PIRACY SITUATION (NOV 2023 – JUL 2025)

PIRACY ASSESSMENT

(U) The PIRACY Threat Assessment (TA) is determined as **LOW** in the GULF OF ADEN and SOMALI BASIN, while it remains **MODERATE** in the coastal areas from LAASGORAY to the South of TITO.

(U) It is a **REALISTIC POSSIBILITY** that two potential PAGs are active at unknown locations inland in the NE area of PUNTLAND

(U) It is **ALMOST CERTAIN** that there are no PAGs at sea.



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ATALANTA PIRACY THREAT UPDATE

ATALANTA	UPDATE ON THE PIRACY THREAT OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA	10 JUL 2025
<p>Situation: Nothing significant to report</p> <p>Pirates' modus operandi: The typical pirate strategy involves the seizure and hijacking of a dhow, which is subsequently utilized as a mother ship. The pirates then blend in with the usual traffic and deploy skiffs from the mother ship to attack vessels, navigating as far as 600 Nautical Miles or more, off the East Somali coast. The possibility of Attacks in the Gulf of Aden (GOA) should not be ignored, especially in the Eastern side. After a vessel is seized, it is likely that this is taken to the Somali coast and held there whilst ransom negotiations are ongoing.</p> <p>Threat evaluation: These armed robberies within Somali territorial waters demonstrate an active and evolving threat in the region. Despite routine patrols conducted by Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), EUNAVFOR ATALANTA and other warships in these waters, pirates continue to demonstrate sophisticated operational capabilities. These incidents highlight the existence of well-established coastal support infrastructure and the ability to conduct coordinated operations. The successful execution of recent attacks indicates that pirate action groups maintain the capability and intent to target vessels in this region. This assessment is supported by their demonstrated ability to operate within territorial waters, utilize multiple coastal locations, and sustain extended operations</p>		



Registration and reporting. CSO's and masters are encourage to register their vessels with both MSCIO (<https://mscio.eu/reporting/vessel-registration/>) and UKMTO (<https://www.ukmto.org/reporting-formats/initial-report>) upon entering the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area and report all incidents to UKMTO and MSCIO.

When safe to do so, vessels should document incidents and suspicious activity through logs, photographs, video, and radar footage. CSOs should gather information on Pattern of Life and Maritime Domain Awareness for their planned routes and ports of call to support risk assessments. These procedures enable effective monitoring and resource allocation by CMF and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA.

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