





MSCIO ATALANTA WEEKLY REPORT

12th Jun – 18th Jun

 postmaster@mscio.eu


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OVERVIEW OF INCIDENTS IN THE VOLUNTARY REPORTING AREA (VRA)



CATEGORY		No.
	Armed Robbery	Nil
	Attack	3
	Attempted Boarding	Nil
	Boarding	Nil
	Hijack	Nil
	Kidnap	Nil
	Piracy	3
	Suspicious Activity	1
	Other Maritime Crimes	Nil
Total Incidents		7




PIRACY



- **TYPE OF INCIDENT:** PIRACY.
- **LOCATION:** Horn of Africa, Somalia.
- **RELEVANT INFORMATION RELATED WITH THE EVENT:**

Several piracy-related incidents continue to be monitored off the coasts of Somalia and Yemen. On 26 April, the merchant vessel M/V SWARD (IMO 9174244) was confirmed hijacked and remains under the control of armed individuals, with its latest reported position at 07°13'N 049°33'E. Operation ATALANTA also continues monitoring the hijacking of tanker M/T HONOUR 25 (IMO 1099735), first reported on 21 April, with the latest reported position at 08°55'N 050°33'E. Additionally, on 2 May, armed individuals reportedly boarded and hijacked tanker EUREKA (IMO 1022823) while at anchorage off Qana Port, Yemen; Operation ATALANTA later confirmed the vessel's position at 09°50'N 050°54'E. Operation ATALANTA assets have also confirmed that the dhow hijacked on 25 April 2026 has been released and the crew is safe. All remaining incidents continue to be monitored by Operation ATALANTA assets in coordination with regional authorities, while vessels operating in the area are advised to maintain heightened vigilance, adhere to BMP-MS guidance, and report suspicious activity to MSCIO and UKMTO.





ATTACK/SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY

- **TYPE OF INCIDENT:** SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY

- **LOCATION:** Strait of Hormuz

- **RELEVANT INFORMATION RELATED WITH THE EVENT:**

During the reporting period, MSCIO issued four alerts related to small-craft activity in the Gulf of Aden and off the northern Somali coast.

On 14 June, ALERT 62/26 was issued following an attack reported off the northern Somali coast, during which two armed skiffs approached a merchant vessel, opened fire and ordered the vessel to stop. The vessel's security team returned fire and the skiffs subsequently disengaged.

On 15 June, ALERT 63/26 was issued following a reported attack in the southern Gulf of Aden, south of Yemen, involving an armed skiff that reportedly opened fire and attempted to board a merchant vessel. Following further investigation by Operation ATALANTA, the incident was subsequently reclassified as SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY.

Later on 15 June, ALERT 64/26 was issued following an attack in the central Gulf of Aden, southeast of Aden, involving an armed skiff that opened fire on a tanker and reportedly launched an RPG towards the vessel. The vessel's security team responded and the skiff disengaged.

On 17 June, ALERT 65/26 was issued following an attack in the central Gulf of Aden, northeast of Aden, when two armed skiffs approached a merchant vessel and opened fire. The vessel's security team returned fire and the skiffs subsequently withdrew.

In all attack-related incidents, defensive measures were successfully implemented and no successful boardings were reported.





ASSESSMENT AND GUIDANCE FOR AS/SoH/GoO



- The maritime security environment in the Strait of Hormuz has improved following the cessation of blockade operations and the reopening of the waterway to commercial shipping. According to [JMIC Advisory Note 009-26](#), the regional threat level has been reduced to MODERATE.
- Active mine clearance operations remain ongoing within the Strait of Hormuz. Mariners should continue to exercise caution and remain aware of the presence of mines in the area.
- A confirmed mine location remains reported at position 26°24'34.920"N 056°20'40.128"E. The International Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) should be avoided at this time due to the existence of mines.
- The southern transit route through Omani Territorial Waters has been confirmed clear of mines and remains the recommended route for merchant shipping.
- Mariners should expect the continued presence of naval forces supporting maritime security and mine clearance operations, as well as possible VHF hailing intended to facilitate the safe flow of traffic.
- During the reporting period, JMIC published Advisory Note 009-26 "Strait of Hormuz Open", providing updated guidance for vessels transiting the area.
- A [NAVAREA warning](#) remains in force concerning mine-related hazards in the Strait of Hormuz.
- It is advised for merchant vessels to:
 - Follow the latest JMIC and NAVAREA guidance.
 - Avoid the International Traffic Separation Scheme until further notice.
 - Use the recommended southern transit route through Omani Territorial Waters where appropriate.
 - Maintain awareness of naval activity and mine clearance operations.
 - Report any suspicious activity or relevant information to MSCIO and UKMTO.



ASSESSMENT AND GUIDANCE FOR RED SEA/BeM



- The maritime threat level in the Gulf of Aden, Bab el-Mandeb and Southern Red Sea remains MODERATE. Commercial traffic continues steadily through the area and no confirmed attacks on merchant shipping have been reported during the latest reporting period.
- Houthi messaging and hostile rhetoric continue without associated operational indicators, while the potential for renewed disruption remains should regional tensions escalate. Merchant vessels should continue to consider possible exposure based on ownership, cargo, Flag State affiliations or perceived associations with countries of interest.
- GNSS interference remains a residual hazard across the central Red Sea, with periodic effects extending into the southern sector and Bab el Mandeb approaches. Mariners should verify positions using alternative navigation methods when required.
- It is advised for merchant vessels to:
 - Maintain navigation through international waters for as long as possible.
 - Navigate closer to the African coastline where feasible and operationally appropriate.
 - Maintain close coordination with MSCIO, UKMTO and relevant maritime security reporting centers.
 - Conduct voyage-specific risk assessments and strictly adhere to BMP-MS.
 - Monitor electronic interference and verify navigation data through radar and visual cross-checks.
 - Review vessel affiliations, cargo exposure and ownership considerations prior to transit.
 - Maintain enhanced vigilance and report suspicious activity immediately to MSCIO and UKMTO.



MARITIME SECURITY EVENTS RELATED TO PIRACY (STATUS AND DETAILED DESCRIPTION FROM JAN 2026)

No	Date	Name	MSE Category	Last info.
57	19 APR	FV ALKHAYR 2	Hijacked	PMPF informed via IORIS on 21 April that FV "ALKHAYR 2" was hijacked IVO Xaafuun on 19 th April by 11 armed individuals (PAG). The FV was released on 21 Apr by the PAG.
58	21 APR (TBD)	MT HONOUR 25	Pirated	PMPF informed via IORIS on 21 April that FV "ALKHAYR 2" was hijacked IVO Xaafuun on 19 th April by 11 armed individuals (PAG). On 21 Apr OHQ was informed that MT HONOUR 25 was pirated by the PAGAND and subsequently MT HONOUR 25 sailed ivo KULULE, SOMALIA where is currently anchored. Operation Atalanta assets are closely monitor the ongoing situation.
59	22 APR	MV ELFRIEDE	Piracy attack	A small white fishing boat rapidly approach the MV. At approximately 600 metres warning shots were fired and the persons on-board the approaching boat returned fire. The craft then broke off, joined another FV and moved away both of them. The master of MV reports all crew is safe.
60	25 APR	CV FAHAD 4	Armed Robbery at Sea	EUNAVFOR ATALANTA received info from PMPF stating that it was hijacked by a PAG of 11 individuals IVO DHINOWDA (10NM off coast). ALMOST CERTAIN it has been involved in the suspicious approach towards the MT MINERVA PISCES on 28 th APR. Released on 04 May 26 after ransom was paid.
61	26 APR	MV SWARD	Pirated	EUNAVFOR ATALANTA received a report from PMPF that MV SWARD was hijacked near GARACAD offshore area , outside TTW. Vessel owner informed PMPF. Subsequently the hijacked vessel sailed to SOMALIA where currently is anchored ivo CEEL DHAHANAAAN, SOMALIA. Operation Atalanta assets are closely monitor the ongoing situation.
62	28 APR	MT MINERVA PISCES	Suspicious Approach/Activity	A suspicious Dhow crossed the MT from starboard to port at a CPA approx 1.2NM. A skiff was then sighted ahead and later approached from the starboard bow o a distance of approx 400m. All crew are safe and accounted for. MT continued sailing towards the next port of call.

● Solved or closed cases.
● Active cases



MARITIME SECURITY EVENTS RELATED TO PIRACY (STATUS AND DETAILED DESCRIPTION FROM JAN 2026)

No	Date	Name	MSE Category	Last info.
63	01 MAY	MV NEW VENTURE	Suspicious Approach/Activity	MSCIO received a report of an incident involving a MV, while sailing towards the IRTC. A suspicious skiff carrying approximately 7 armed people approached the vessel, closing to a distance of 10 meters approx. and reportedly demonstrating clear intent to board. After MV increased the speed and carried out defensive measures, the skiff aborted their approach.
64	02 MAY	MT EUREKA	Pirated	MSCIO received a report of a possible hijacking involving MT EUREKA, while at anchorage off QANA Port, SHABWA, YEMEN. Armed individuals boarded the vessel and took control. The vessel sailed to the Somalian coast and is currently anchored ivo FUNDHUC DULE, SOMALIA. Operation Atalanta assets are closely monitor the ongoing situation.
65	23 MAY	EVENT 65 (MT)	Attempted Boarding	On 23 May 0215Z (86NM NNW of CAALULA), EVENT 65 (MT) reported that they were approached and followed by 1 skiff with 5 POB (after photo received, the actual number was found to be 7). The MT implemented BMP and PAST and attackers aborted their approach.
66	23 MAY	EVENT 66 (MT)	Attempted Boarding	On 23 May 0325Z (close posn to EVENT 65), EVENT 66 (MT)reported that they were approached by a skiff matching the same description from the previous report of EVENT 65. The MT implemented BMP and PAST and attackers aborted their approach.
67	23 MAY	EVENT 67 (MT)	Attempted Boarding	On 23 May 0728Z (close posn to events Nr 65 and 66), EVENT 67 (MT)reported that they were being approached by a skiff. The MT implemented BMP and PAST and attackers aborted their approach.
68	23 MAY	CD MASHAALLAH 1 152	Attempted Boarding	On 23 May 1634Z (close posn to events Nr 65 5,66 and 67), the skiff approached this cargo dhow . Indian Navy intercepted the skiff which escaped back to Somalian coast.
69	10 JUN	MV MARIA F	Suspicious Approach/Activity	On 10 Jun 0342Z, a small craft with 6 armed POB approached the vessel and there was an exchange of fire between the small craft and vessel. No persons were reported injured, small craft turned away and MV MARIA F continued their destination to next Port of Call.

- Solved or closed cases.
- Active cases



MARITIME SECURITY EVENTS RELATED TO PIRACY (STATUS AND DETAILED DESCRIPTION FROM JAN 2026)




No	Date	Name	MSE Category	Last info.
70	15 JUN 26	MT VST AMARA	Piracy Attack	On 15 Jun 1335Z, MSCIO received a report of an incident involving a MT, while sailing towards the IRTC. A suspicious skiff carrying approximately 3 -5 armed people approached the vessel, and reportedly opened fire on the vessel using an RPG. The vessel implemented defensive measures and the attack was unsuccessful. No injuries or damages were reported.MT continued with its journey to its next Port of Call.
71	17 JUN 26	MT FAREEDA 5	Piracy Attack	On 17 Jun 1610Z, MSCIO received a report of an incident involving a MT, while sailing towards the IRTC. Two skiffs carrying unknown number of armed POB approached the vessel, and reportedly opened fire. The vessel implemented defensive measures and the attack was unsuccessful.MT continued with its journey to its next Port of Call , according to YCG one person of the crew was injured.

- Solved or closed cases.
- Active cases




PIRACY STATISTICS (NOV 2023 – MAY 2026)


PIRACY RELATED EVENTS FROM NOV 2023 (71)



PIRACY RELATED EVENTS FROM 2008



- SUSPICIOUS APPROACH/ ACTIVITY
 - Sudden changes of course towards the ship and aggressive behavior. CPA inside 1nm with clear intention to attack and/or weapons clearly displayed.
- ATTEMPTED BOARDING
 - An Act where the PAG failed to get onboard and gain control of the vessel or members of the crew. Boarding paraphernalia were employed or visible in the approach.
- BOARDING
 - A boarding in which the attackers have boarded the ship but have NOT taken control.
- PIRACY ATTACK/ ARMED ROBBERY ATTEMPT
 - Ship has been subject to an aggressive approach by unidentified craft and weapons have been discharged. Also, paraphernalia/ tripwires related to piracy, hooks, ladders ect have been reported.
- HIJACK
 - Attackers have illegally boarded and taken control of a vessel at the high seas against the crew's will.
- PIRATED
 - A pirated vessel is a vessel subject to an act that falls under the UNCLOS Article 101 definition of piracy.
- ARMED ROBBERY AT SEA
 - Any illegal act of violence or detention within a state's internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial seas.



PIRACY ASSESSMENT

It is ALMOST CERTAIN that the PAG's tactics for conducting piracy on the high seas involve hijacking a dhow and using it as a mother ship. The pirates then blend in with the usual traffic and deploy skiffs from the mother ship to attack vessels. They are able to navigate to the high seas, with evidence of events up to up to 600 nautical miles off the East Somali coast.

Nevertheless, from November 2024 it is becoming increasingly common for a group of people to organise themselves, identify a vulnerable ship close to the coast and use skiffs to carry out an attack. These attacks typically target Yemeni fishing dhows. While there is no confirmed information, it is HIGHLY LIKELY that ransoms would have been paid.


On the other hand, that risk could be amplified if local fishermen turn into pirates as a consequence that no effective action is being taken from the authorities to safeguard Somali TTW from IUUF.

It is ALMOST CERTAIN that the ransom paid for the LIAO DONG YU have set a bad example for other pirate groups trying to imitate that operation.

PIRACY ASSESSMENT

(EU R) The PIRACY Threat Assessment (TA) is determined as:

- **MODERATE** in the perimeter drawn between points A, B, C and D.
- **SUBSTANTIAL** in the perimeter drawn between points E, F, G and H.
- **LOW** in the remaining areas.



THREAT ASSESSMENT	BENIGN	LOW	MODERATE	SUBSTANTIAL	SEVERE	CRITICAL
YARDSTICK	An attack is HIGHLY UNLIKELY (10% - 20%)	An attack is UNLIKELY (>25% - 35%)	An attack is a REALISTIC POSSIBILITY (40% - <50%)	An attack is LIKELY / PROBABLE (55% - <75%)	An attack is HIGHLY LIKELY (80% - 90%)	An attack is ALMOST CERTAIN (>95%)



REGISTRATION AND REPORTING

REGISTRATION AND REPORTING.

CSO's and Masters are encouraged to register their vessels upon entering the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area with both:

- MSCIO (<https://mscio.eu/reporting/vessel-registration/>)
- UKMTO (<https://www.ukmto.org/reporting-formats/initial-report>)

And to report all incidents to UKMTO and MSCIO.

When safe to do so, vessels should document incidents and suspicious activity through logs, photographs, video, and radar footage. CSOs should gather information on Pattern of Life and Maritime Situational Awareness for their planned routes and ports of call to support risk assessments. These procedures enable effective monitoring and resource allocation by CMF and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA.

Contact Information (MSCIO):

Tel: 0033 (0) 298 220 220 // 0033 (0) 298 220 170

Website: www.mscio.eu

Email: postmaster@mscio.eu

MARITIME SECURITY CENTRE INDIAN OCEAN (MSCIO)

VOLUNTARY REPORTING THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE



WHY TO REPORT

- Improve Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA)
- Enable rapid information-sharing and coordination.
- Support vessels in High Risk Areas.
- Contribute to collective maritime security efforts.

WHAT TO REPORT

- Entry into the Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA).
- Daily position updates.
- Exit from the VRA or arrival at a safe port.
- Suspicious activity or incidents.
- Attacks, attempted or successful.

HOW TO REPORT

- Online: www.mscio.eu
- Email: postmaster@mscio.eu
- Copy UKMTO: watchkeepers@ukmto.com

BENEFITS OF REPORTING

- IMPROVED MONITORING AND PROTECTION DURING TRANSIT -
- ACCESS TO TIMELY THREAT ASSESSMENTS AND SECURITY ALERTS -
- ENHANCED COORDINATION WITH NAVAL FORCES OPERATING IN THE REGION -

Your report strengthens maritime security across the Indian Ocean and Red Sea