



MSCIO ATALANTA WEEKLY REPORT

13 Jun – 19 Jun

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OVERVIEW OF INCIDENTS IN THE VOLUNTARY REPORTING AREA (VRA)



CATEGORY	No.	Page Ref.
Armed Robbery	Nil	NSTR
Attack	Nil	NSTR
Attempted Boarding	Nil	NSTR
Boarding	Nil	NSTR
Hijack	Nil	NSTR
Kidnap	Nil	NSTR
Piracy	Nil	NSTR
Suspicious Activity	Nil	NSTR
Other Maritime Crimes	1	2
Total Incidents	1 (Note 1)	

Note 1: The events described in page two are considered as a whole since they are consecutive reports related with GNSS interferences affecting to the same area since 13 to 19 Jun 25.



OTHER MARITIME CRIMES

1. SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS IN THE VRA.

1.1 GNSS INTERFERENCES: Successive reports related GNSS interferences.

1.2 PERIOD: 13 to 19 JUN 2025.

1.3 LOCATION: the Strait of Hormuz, the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.

1.4 DURATION: Effects lasted hours.

2. ANOTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION RELATED WITH GNSS DISRUPTIONS.

During this week, MSCIO has registered a sharp increase in the reports related with GNSS disruption effects in the Strait of Hormuz, the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman areas. This increase is aligned with the reports issued by UKMTO and JMIC in the UKMTO web site:



UKMTO: [Recent Incidents](#)

MSCIO: [MSC IO | Alerts](#) [MSC IO | Weekly Threat Assessment](#)

JMIC: [008 JMIC Advisory Note Update 008 \(1\).pdf](#)

NAVAREA: [hydrography.paknavy.gov.pk/wp-content/plugins/navarea-warnings/custom_uploaded_warnings_for_navarea/20250618SEC_294.txt](#)

In the map showed on the right side, a summary of all the events related with GNSS interferences happened during the last week can be consulted.



To understand more about specific virtual threats, BMP offers a detailed description about different ways to suffer a GNSS disruption. (Pag 15). [bmo-ms-2025-final-hi-res.pdf](#)



LAST PIRACY RELATED EVENTS (STATUS AND DETAILED DESCRIPTION)

No	Date	Name	MSE Category	Last info
45	7 FEB	FV AL NAJMA	Armed Robbery	Reported hijacked dhow ivo EYL. 6 hijackers. On 12 Feb, the hijackers left the dhow. No information of any ransom paid was confirmed
46	15 FEB	FV SAYTUUN 2	Armed Robbery	Reported hijacked vessel ivo EYL. 6 hijackers. On 22 Feb, the hijackers, after stealing the crew's belongings, abandoned the dhow. A ransom has been paid
47	16 MAR	FV AL HIDAYA	Armed Robbery	Hijack reported off the coast of "DURDURA" South of XAFUN - 5 hijackers.


Locations of the events 45, 46 and 47 are marked with  in pag 5.

- Solved or closed cases
- Active cases
- Unsolved cases




PIRACY STATISTICS (NOV 2023 – JUN 2025)

47 Events




PIRACY RELATED EVENTS



- Pirated (Outside TTW) / Armed Robbery at sea (Inside TTW)**
 - PAG takes control of the ship and requests a ransom
- Piracy Attack**
 - PAG unsuccessful attack on ship
- Hijack**
 - Attackers boarded and taken control of a ship against the crew's will
- Boarding**
 - Successful attack but pirates do not take control
- Suspicious Approach**
 - Suspicious maneuvering with clear intentions to attack. (weapons clearly displayed)



PIRACY SITUATION (NOV 2023 – JUN 2025)



PIRACY ASSESSMENT

It is **ALMOST CERTAIN** that the PAGs (Pirate Action Groups) tactics for conducting piracy on the high seas involve hijacking a dhow and using it as a mother ship. The pirates then blend in with the usual traffic and deploy skiffs from the mother ship to attack vessels. They are able to navigate up to 600 nautical miles or more off the East Somali coast.

On the other hand, that risk could be amplified if local fishermen turn into pirates as a consequence that no effective action is being taken from the authorities to safeguard the Somali TTW from IUU (Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated) fishing.

REMOTE CHANCE <5%	HIGHLY UNLIKELY 10% – 20%	UNLIKELY >25% – 35%	REALISTIC POSSIBILITY 40% – <50%	LIKELY / PROBABLE 55% – <75%	HIGHLY LIKELY 80% – 90%	ALMOST CERTAIN >95%
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ATALANTA PIRACY THREAT UPDATE

ATALANTA

UPDATE ON THE PIRACY THREAT OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA

19 JUN 2025

Situation: Nothing significant to report

Pirates' modus operandi: The typical pirate strategy involves the seizure and hijacking of a dhow, which is subsequently utilized as a mother ship. The pirates then blend in with the usual traffic and deploy skiffs from the mother ship to attack vessels, navigating as far as 600 Nautical Miles or more, off the East Somali coast. The possibility of Attacks in the Gulf of Aden (GOA) should not be ignored, especially in the Eastern side. After a vessel is seized, it is likely that this is taken to the Somali coast and held there whilst ransom negotiations are ongoing.

Threat evaluation: These armed robberies within Somali territorial waters demonstrate an active and evolving threat in the region. Despite routine patrols conducted by Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), EUNAVFOR ATALANTA and other warships in these waters, pirates continue to demonstrate sophisticated operational capabilities. These incidents highlight the existence of well-established coastal support infrastructure and the ability to conduct coordinated operations. The successful execution of recent attacks indicates that pirate action groups maintain the capability and intent to target vessels in this region. This assessment is supported by their demonstrated ability to operate within territorial waters, utilize multiple coastal locations, and sustain extended operations



Registration and reporting. CSO's and masters are encourage to register their vessels with both MSCIO (<https://mscio.eu/reporting/vessel-registration/>) and UKMTO (<https://www.ukmto.org/reporting-formats/initial-report>) upon entering the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area and report all incidents to UKMTO and MSCIO.

When safe to do so, vessels should document incidents and suspicious activity through logs, photographs, video, and radar footage. CSOs should gather information on Pattern of Life and Maritime Domain Awareness for their planned routes and ports of call to support risk assessments. These procedures enable effective monitoring and resource allocation by CMF and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA.

Contact Information:

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ADVISORY



Area of concern: Arabian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz and Northern Arabian Sea.

Open-source information and regional diplomatic developments indicate a marked escalation in tensions between Israel and Iran. The situation remains fluid and highly volatile. At present, there is no direct evidence that commercial shipping is being targeted. However, given the proximity of regional flashpoints to major maritime routes, the potential for rapid escalation involving a maritime nexus should not be discounted.

Updated information in the following links:

UKMTO: Advisory # 23

[20250616-UKMTO ADVISORY 023-25 \(2\).pdf](#)

JMIC: JMIC# 008-25 (updated 008)

[008 JMIC Advisory Note Update 008 \(1\).pdf](#)

MSCIO:

[20250613 advisory to MSCIO and message to companies \(6\).pdf](#)

[20250617 ASPIDES advisory message to companies \(1\).pdf](#)

The information herein is derived from open-source information and does not confirm any deliberate targeting of maritime interests as of this publication.

