# MSCIO ATALANTA
# WEEKLY REPORT

## 14th Nov – 20th Nov

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# OVERVIEW OF INCIDENTS IN THE VOLUNTARY REPORTING AREA (VRA)



| CATEGORY | No. | Page Ref. |
|---|---|---|
| 📍 Armed Robbery | Nil | NSTR |
| 📍 Attack | Nil | NSTR |
| 📍 Attempted Boarding | Nil | NSTR |
| 📍 Boarding | 1 | Page 2 |
| 📍 Hijack | Nil | NSTR |
| 📍 Kidnap | Nil | NSTR |
| 📍 Piracy | Nil | NSTR |
| 📍 Suspicious Activity | Nil | NSTR |
| 📍 Other Maritime Crimes | Nil | NSTR |
| **Total Incidents** | | 1 |

UKMTO reported an incident approximately 20NM east of *Khawr Fakkan* (UAE) involving the seizure of the Marshall Islands-flagged crude oil tanker **TALARA**. The vessel, which had been transiting towards Iranian territorial waters, was initially assessed as engaging in suspicious activity.

Subsequent confirmation indicated that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) had seized the tanker, stating that the action followed a judicial order to "safeguard the interests and resources of the Iranian nation," alleging the transport of "unauthorized goods." The incident was therefore considered state activity.

On 20 November, **MV TALARA** was released by Iranian authorities. Both vessel and crew were reported safe and ready to operate.



**More information available in the following links:**

**UKMTO:**
Recent Incidents
20251121_UKMTO_Summary_Report_15-21Nov25

**JMIC:**
126 JMIC Information Note Suspicious Activity
126 JMIC Information Note Suspicious Activity Final Update
JMIC Week 46 Dashboard 10 November - 16 November 2025

# OTHER REPORTS

The following reports were received by MSCIO and were subjected to a thorough assessment. <u>The analysis on the first one concluded that it was not piracy-related, while the other one is currently under investigation by OP ATALANTA.</u>

**REPORT 1. 14 NOV. 0940 UTC**

MSCIO received a report from a merchant vessel regarding a high speed craft, which suddenly altered course towards an MV and increased the speed up to 25 kts, as to chase the vessel.

MV increased also her speed and altered course to steer away from the suspicious craft. General alarm was raised but eventually the high speed craft reduced her speed so the distance between both started to increase.

The closest distance was 6Nm and no assessment could be made by MV crew regarding POB or weapons on the high speed craft.

**REPORT 2. 18 NOV.**

MSCIO received a report regarding a probable seizure of a Yemeni dhow in the area of Bereeda (Somalia). **This event is currently under investigation by OP ATALANTA.**

MSCIO ENCOURAGES MASTERS TO KEEP REPORTING ANY SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY OBSERVED WHILE TRANSITING THROUGH THE VRA TO MSCIO AND UKMTO.

# SUMMARY GNSS EVENTS

**1. SUMMARY OF THE GNSS EVENTS REGISTERED BY MSCIO FROM 31st OCT to 20th NOV 2025.**

Although MSCIO has not received any GNSS interference report in recent days, MSCIO encourages masters not only to remain prepared to face potential GNSS interference, but also to avoid relying solely on the current low number of reported incidents.

As stated in both UKMTO Summary Report and JMIC Weekly Dashboard, concentration levels of GNSS interference appear to have decreased to levels seen at the beginning of the year.

Masters of vessels are encouraged to report any GNSS interference event to MSCIO and UKMTO.

**More information available in the following links:**

**Flightradar24:**
GPS Jamming Data

**NAVWARN:**hydrography.paknavy.gov.pk/wp-content/plugins/navarea-warnings/custom_uploaded_warnings_for_navarea/20251013SEC 474 .txt



**MSCIO reported events:**
- 🟡 Events registered since 31st Oct to 06th Nov.
- 🟠 Events register since 07th Nov to 13th Nov.
- 🔴 Events registered since 14th Nov to 20th Nov.

**OPEN SOURCES**: MSC IO | Maritime Cybersecurity Information

**To know more about different maritime security threats, please access to the following links:**

MSC IO | Useful Links

**1. General Maritime Security:**

MSC IO | General Maritime Security

**2. Maritime Terrorism:**

MSC IO | Maritime Terrorism

**3. Piracy Information:**

MSC IO | Piracy Information

**4. Illegal Traffic and Fishing**

MSC IO | Illegal Traffic & Fishing

**5. Maritime Cybersecurity Information.**

MSC IO | Maritime Cybersecurity Information

**6. Submarine Critical Infrastructure.**

MSC IO | Submarine Critical Infraestructure

# LAST PIRACY RELATED EVENTS (STATUS AND DETAILED DESCRIPTION)

| No | Date | Name | MSE Category | Last info. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 45 | 7 FEB | FV AL NAJMA | Armed Robbery | Reported hijacked dhow ivo EYL. 6 hijackers. On 12 Feb, the hijackers left the dhow. No information of any ransom paid was confirmed. |
| 46 | 15 FEB | FV SAYTUUN 2 | Armed Robbery | Reported hijacked vessel ivo EYL. 6 hijackers. On 22 Feb, the hijackers, after stealing the crew's belongings, abandoned the dhow. A ransom has been paid. |
| 47 | 16 MAR | FV AL-HIDAYA | Armed Robbery | Hijack reported off the coast of "DURDURA" South of XAFUN, Somalia - 5 hijackers. After 5 days it was reported that the hijackers left the vessel. According to Yemeni authorities no ransom has was paid. |
| 48 | 28 OCT | FV 314055ISSAMOHAHMDI | Armed Robbery | Hijack reported off the coast of Garacad. |
| 49 | 02 NOV | FV INTERTUNA TRES | Piracy Attack | 362nm East of Mogadishu, Master reports 4 unauthorized persons attempted to board his vessel using a skiff. The boarding was repelled by the PAST onboard who shot 2 warning shots. |
| 50 | 03 NOV | MV STOLT SAGALAND | Piracy Attack | 332nm East of Mogadishu, Master reports 4 unauthorized persons attempted to board his vessel using a skiff. The boarding was repelled by the PAST onboard which exchanged fire with the PAG. |
| 51 | 06 NOV | MT HELLAS APHRODITE | Piracy Attack | 760nm East of Mogadishu. MT was boarded by PAG. Op Atalanta currently (07/11/25) Liberating the vessel. |
| 52 | 11 NOV | MT AL THUMAMA | Piracy Attack | 714nm NE of Mogadishu (120NM North of event 51) Master reports being approached by a skiff with 3 PAGS. The MT managed to outrun the skiff. |

● Solved or closed cases     ● Active cases     ● Unsolved cases

# PIRACY STATISTICS (NOV 2023 – NOV 2025)

## 52 Events



Legend: PIRATED-ARMED ROBBERY, PIRACY ATTACK, BOARDING, SUSPICIOUS APPROACH, HIJACK

## PIRACY RELATED EVENTS



| Pirated (Outside TTW) / Armed Robbery at sea (Inside TTW) |
| --- |
| • PAG takes control of the ship and requests a ransom |

| Piracy Attack |
| --- |
| • PAG unsuccessful attack on ship |

| Hijack |
| --- |
| • Attackers boarded and taken control of a ship against the crew's will |

| Boarding |
| --- |
| • Successful attack but pirates do not take control |

| Suspicious Approach |
| --- |
| • Suspicious maneuvering with clear intentions to attack. (weapons clearly displayed) |

# PIRACY SITUATION (NOV 2023 – NOV 2025)



## PIRACY ASSESSMENT

It is ALMOST CERTAIN that the PAG's tactics for conducting piracy on the high seas involve hijacking a dhow and using it as a mother ship. The pirates then blend in with the usual traffic and deploy skiffs from the mother ship to attack vessels. They are able to navigate to the high seas, with evidence of events up to up to 600 nautical miles off the East Somali coast.

Nevertheless, from November 2024 it is becoming increasingly common for a group of people to organise themselves, identify a vulnerable ship close to the coast and use skiffs to carry out an attack. These attacks typically target Yemeni fishing dhows. While there is no confirmed information, it is HIGHLY LIKELY that ransoms would have been paid.

On the other hand, that risk could be amplified if local fishermen turn into pirates as a consequence that no effective action is being taken from the authorities to safeguard Somali TTW from IUUF.

**Map legend:**
- 🟢 EVENTS FROM NOV 23 - JUN 25
- 🔴 EVENTS THAT OCURRED IN THE LAST 30 DAYS
- 🔺 CAMPS RELATED TO PIRACY
- ▭ EVENTS DIRECTLY RELATED WITH EUNAVFOR

**Higher piracy threat** based on the capability of PAG operating directly from the coastal without mother ship and suitable weather.

## PIRACY ASSESSMENT

The PIRACY Threat Assessment (TA) is determined as **LOW** in the GULF OF ADEN.

From LAASGORAY to BEREEDA and from BEREEDA to MEEREG remain **MODERATE**.



| THREAT ASSESSMENT | BENIGN | LOW | MODERATE | SUBSTANTIAL | SEVERE | CRITICAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| YARDSTICK | An attack is **HIGHLY UNLIKELY** (10% – 20%) | An attack is **UNLIKELY** (>25% – 35%) | An attack is a **REALISTIC POSSIBILITY** (40% – <50%) | An attack is **LIKELY / PROBABLE** (55% – <75%) | An attack is **HIGHLY LIKELY** (80% – 90%) | An attack is **ALMOST CERTAIN** (>95%) |

**Registration and reporting**.

CSO's and masters are encouraged to register their vessels upon entering the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area with both:

- MSCIO (**https://mscio.eu/reporting/vessel-registration/**)

- UKMTO (**https://www.ukmto.org/reporting-formats/initial-report**)

And report all incidents to UKMTO and MSCIO.

When safe to do so, vessels should document incidents and suspicious activity through logs, photographs, video, and radar footage. CSOs should gather information on Pattern of Life and Maritime Situational Awareness for their planned routes and ports of call to support risk assessments. These procedures enable effective monitoring and resource allocation by CMF and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA.

**Contact Information (MSCIO):**

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