



MSCIO ATALANTA WEEKLY REPORT

15 Aug – 21 Aug

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OVERVIEW OF INCIDENTS IN THE VOLUNTARY REPORTING AREA (VRA)




CATEGORY	No.	Page Ref.
 Armed Robbery	Nil	NSTR
 Attack	Nil	NSTR
 Attempted Boarding	Nil	NSTR
 Boarding	Nil	NSTR
 Hijack	Nil	NSTR
 Kidnap	Nil	NSTR
 Piracy	Nil	NSTR
 Suspicious Activity	Nil	NSTR
 Other Maritime Crimes	Nil	NSTR
Total Incidents	0	



OTHER MARITIME CRIMES

1. SUMMARY OF THE GNSS EVENTS REGISTERED BY MSCIO FROM 01 TO 21 AUG 2025.

In the map showed on the right side, a summary of all the events related with GNSS interferences happened during the last three weeks can be consulted.



01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Read note 2.

AUG

Although MSCIO has not received any GNSS interferences report since August 14th, information provided through JMIC Dashboard [JMIC Week 33 Dashboard 11 August - 17 August 2025.pdf](#), the GNSS interferences effects are still noted in areas such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea. In accordance to the same publication, the GNSS interferences in these areas are “likely to originate from areas IVO Port Sudan and the Iranian coastlines especially around the Strait of Hormuz”.

More information available in the following links:

MSCIO: [MSC IO | Weekly Threat Assessment](#)


[MSC IO | Alerts](#)

UKMTO: [20250822 ukmt0_summary_report-22aug25.pdf](#)

JMIC: [JMIC Week 33 Dashboard 11 August - 17 August 2025.pdf](#)

More info about virtual threats:

[bmp-ms-2025-final-hi-res.pdf](#)



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LAST PIRACY RELATED EVENTS (STATUS AND DETAILED DESCRIPTION)

No	Date	Name	MSE Category	Last info
45	7 FEB	FV AL NAJMA	Armed Robbery	Reported hijacked dhow ivo EYL. 6 hijackers. On 12 Feb, the hijackers left the dhow. No information of any ransom paid was confirmed
46	15 FEB	FV SAYTUUN 2	Armed Robbery	Reported hijacked vessel ivo EYL. 6 hijackers. On 22 Feb, the hijackers, after stealing the crew's belongings, abandoned the dhow. A ransom has been paid
47	16 MAR	FV AL HIDAYA	Armed Robbery	Hijack reported off the coast of "DURDURA" South of XAFUN, Somalia - 5 hijackers. After 5 days it was reported that the hijackers left the vessel. According to the Yemeni Authorities no ransom was paid.

Locations of the events 45, 46 and 47 are marked with  in pag 5.

 Solved or closed cases


 Active cases

 Unsolved cases




PIRACY STATISTICS (NOV 2023 – AUG 2025)

47 Events



8/14/2025 | 2

MARITIME SECURITY EVENTS



Pirated (Outside TTW) / Armed Robbery at sea (Inside TTW)

• PAG takes control of the ship and requests a ransom

Piracy Attack

• PAG unsuccessful attack on ship

Hijack

• Attackers boarded and taken control of a ship against the crew's will

Boarding

• Successful attack but pirates do not take control

Suspicious Approach

• Suspicious maneuvering with clear intentions to attack. (weapons clearly displayed)

Providing maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean




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PIRACY SITUATION (NOV 2023 – AUG 2025)



PIRACY ASSESSMENT

It is **ALMOST CERTAIN** that the PAGs (Pirate Action Groups) tactics for conducting piracy on the high seas involve hijacking a dhow and using it as a mother ship. The pirates then blend in with the usual traffic and deploy skiffs from the mother ship to attack vessels. They are able to navigate up to 600 nautical miles or more off the East Somali coast.

Nevertheless, from November 2024 it is becoming increasingly common for a group of people to organise themselves, identify a vulnerable ship close to the coast and use skiffs to carry out an attack. These attacks typically target Yemeni fishing dhows. While there is no confirmed information, it is **HIGHLY LIKELY** that ransoms would have been paid.

On the other hand, that risk could be amplified if local fishermen turn into pirates as a consequence that no effective action is being taken from the authorities to safeguard the Somali TTW from IUU (Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated) fishing.

THREAT ASSESSMENT	BENIGN	LOW	MODERATE	SUBSTANTIAL	SEVERE	CRITICAL
YARDSTICK	An attack is HIGHLY UNLIKELY (10% – 20%)	An attack is UNLIKELY (>25% – 35%)	An attack is a REALISTIC POSSIBILITY (40% – <50%)	An attack is LIKELY / PROBABLE (55% – <75%)	An attack is HIGHLY LIKELY (80% – 90%)	An attack is ALMOST CERTAIN (>95%)



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PIRACY SITUATION (NOV 2023 – AUG 2025)

PIRACY ASSESSMENT

The PIRACY Threat Assessment (TA) is determined as **LOW** in the GULF OF ADEN and SOMALI BASIN, while it remains **MODERATE** in the coastal areas from LAASGORAY to the South of TITO.

It is a **REALISTIC POSSIBILITY** that two potential PAGs are active at unknown locations inland in the NE area of PUNTLAND

It is **ALMOST CERTAIN** that there are no PAGs at sea.



THREAT ASSESSMENT	BENIGN	LOW	MODERATE	SUBSTANTIAL	SEVERE	CRITICAL
YARDSTICK	An attack is HIGHLY UNLIKELY (10% – 20%)	An attack is UNLIKELY (25% – 35%)	An attack is a REALISTIC POSSIBILITY (40% – 50%)	An attack is LIKELY / PROBABLE (55% – 75%)	An attack is HIGHLY LIKELY (80% – 90%)	An attack is ALMOST CERTAIN (95%+)



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ATALANTA PIRACY THREAT UPDATE

ATALANTA	UPDATE ON THE PIRACY THREAT OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA	21 AUG 2025
Situation: Nothing significant to report Pirates' modus operandi: The typical pirate strategy involves the seizure and hijacking of a dhow, which is subsequently utilized as a mother ship. The pirates then blend in with the usual traffic and deploy skiffs from the mother ship to attack vessels, navigating as far as 600 Nautical Miles or more, off the East Somali coast. The possibility of Attacks in the Gulf of Aden (GOA) should not be ignored, especially in the Eastern side. After a vessel is seized, it is likely that this is taken to the Somali coast and held there whilst ransom negotiations are ongoing		



REGISTRATION AND REPORTING

Registration and reporting. CSO's and masters are encourage to register their vessels with both MSCIO (<https://mscio.eu/reporting/vessel-registration/>) and UKMTO (<https://www.ukmto.org/reporting-formats/initial-report>) upon entering the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area and report all incidents to UKMTO and MSCIO.

When safe to do so, vessels should document incidents and suspicious activity through logs, photographs, video, and radar footage. CSOs should gather information on Pattern of Life and Maritime Situational Awareness for their planned routes and ports of call to support risk assessments. These procedures enable effective monitoring and resource allocation by CMF and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA.

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