



MSCIO ATALANTA WEEKLY REPORT

16 May – 22 May

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OVERVIEW OF INCIDENTS IN THE VOLUNTARY REPORTING AREA (VRA)



CATEGORY	No.	Page Ref.
 Armed Robbery	Nil	NSTR
 Attack	Nil	NSTR
 Attempted Boarding	Nil	NSTR
 Boarding	Nil	NSTR
 Hijack	Nil	NSTR
 Kidnap	Nil	NSTR
 Piracy	Nil	NSTR
 Suspicious Activity	Nil	NSTR
 Other Maritime Crimes	3	2 - 3 - 4
Total Incidents	3	

OTHER MARITIME CRIMES

1. SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT.

1.1 GNSS INTERFERENCE.

1.2 DATE: MAY 09, 2025.

1.3 LOCATION: 1725N – 04040E RED SEA (📍 marked area in pages 1 and 2. This location is to be considered as a reference point).

1.4 DURATION: GNSS interference can be for hours or short periods of time.

1.5 EFFECTS: Masters have reported GNSS interference have caused adverse effects in different navigational equipment such as GPS, AIS and ECDIS. The alteration of the normal functioning of navigational systems can endanger the navigation in that area.

1.6 ADVISORY: While transiting in areas affected by GNSS interferences, to consider using traditional no electronic means.

1.7 More info: UKMTO ADVISORY #15, MAY 9, 2025.

1.8 Link: [Recent Incidents](#)



OTHER MARITIME CRIMES

1. SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT.

1.1 GPS INTERFERENCE.

1.2 DATE: MAY 18, 2025.

1.3 LOCATION: 2640N – 05630E STRAIT OF HORMUZ (📍 marked area in pages 1 and 3. This location is to be considered as a reference point).

1.4 DURATION: GNSS interference can be for hours or short periods of time.

1.5 EFFECTS: Masters have reported GNSS interference have caused adverse effects in different navigational equipment such as GPS, AIS and ECDIS. The alteration of the normal functioning of navigational systems can endanger the navigation in that area.

1.6 ADVISORY: While transiting in areas affected by GNSS interferences, to consider using traditional no electronic means.

1.7 More info: MSCIO ALERT #2, MAY 18, 2025.

1.8 Link: [MSC IO | Alerts](#)



OTHER MARITIME CRIMES

1. SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT.

1.1 GPS INTERFERENCE.

1.2 DATE: MAY 22, 2025.

1.3 LOCATION: 1830N – 03911E RED SEA (📍 marked area in pages 1 and 4. This location is to be considered as a reference point).

1.4 DURATION: GNSS interference can be for hours or short periods of time.

1.5 EFFECTS: Masters have reported GNSS interference have caused adverse effects in different navigational equipment such as GPS, AIS and ECDIS. The alteration of the normal functioning of navigational systems can endanger the navigation in that area.

1.6 ADVISORY: While transiting in areas affected by GNSS interferences, to consider using traditional no electronic means.

1.7 More info: MSCIO ALERT #1, MAY 22, 2025.


1.8 Link: [MSC IO | Alerts](#)



LAST PIRACY RELATED EVENTS (STATUS AND DETAILED DESCRIPTION)

No	Date	Name	MSE Category	Last info
45	7 FEB	FV AL NAJMA	Armed Robbery	Reported hijacked dhow ivo EYL. 6 hijackers. On 12 Feb, the hijackers left the dhow. No information of any ransom paid was confirmed
46	15 FEB	FV SAYTUUN 2	Armed Robbery	Reported hijacked vessel ivo EYL. 6 hijackers. On 22 Feb, the hijackers, after stealing the crew's belongings, abandoned the dhow. A ransom has been paid
47	16 MAR	FV AL HIDAYA	Armed Robbery	Hijack reported off the coast of "DURDURA" South of XAFUN - 5 hijackers.

Locations of the events 45, 46 and 47 are marked with  in pag 7.

 Solved or closed cases


 Active cases

 Unsolved cases




PIRACY STATISTICS (NOV 2023 – MAY 2025)

47 Events



PIRACY RELATED EVENTS



Pirated (Outside TTW) / Armed Robbery at sea (Inside TTW)

- PAG takes control of the ship and requests a ransom

Piracy Attack

- PAG unsuccessful attack on ship

Hijack

- Attackers boarded and taken control of a ship against the crew's will

Boarding


- Successful attack but pirates do not take control

Suspicious Approach

- Suspicious maneuvering with clear intentions to attack. (weapons clearly displayed)



PIRACY SITUATION (NOV 2023 – MAY 2025)



PIRACY ASSESSMENT

It is **ALMOST CERTAIN** that the PAGs (Pirate Action Groups) tactics for conducting piracy on the high seas involve hijacking a dhow and using it as a mother ship. The pirates then blend in with the usual traffic and deploy skiffs from the mother ship to attack vessels. They are able to navigate up to 600 nautical miles or more off the East Somali coast.

On the other hand, that risk could be amplified if local fishermen turn into pirates as a consequence that no effective action is being taken from the authorities to safeguard the Somali TTW from IUU (Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated) fishing.

REMOTE CHANCE <5%	HIGHLY UNLIKELY 10% – 20%	UNLIKELY >25% – 35%	REALISTIC POSSIBILITY 40% – <50%	LIKELY / PROBABLE 55% – <75%	HIGHLY LIKELY 80% – 90%	ALMOST CERTAIN >95%
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PIRACY THREAT UPDATE

ATALANTA

UPDATE ON THE PIRACY THREAT OFF THE
COAST OF SOMALIA

22 MAY 2025

Situation: Nothing significant to report

Pirates' modus operandi: The typical pirate strategy involves the seizure and hijacking of a dhow, which is subsequently utilized as a mother ship. The pirates then blend in with the usual traffic and deploy skiffs from the mother ship to attack vessels, navigating as far as 600 Nautical Miles or more, off the East Somali coast. The possibility of Attacks in the Gulf of Aden (GOA) should not be ignored, especially in the Eastern side. After a vessel is seized, it is likely that this is taken to the Somali coast and held there whilst ransom negotiations are ongoing.

Threat evaluation: These armed robberies within Somali territorial waters demonstrate an active and evolving threat in the region. Despite routine patrols conducted by Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), EUNAVFOR ATALANTA and other warships in these waters, pirates continue to demonstrate sophisticated operational capabilities. These incidents highlight the existence of well-established coastal support infrastructure and the ability to conduct coordinated operations. The successful execution of recent attacks indicates that pirate action groups maintain the capability and intent to target vessels in this region. This assessment is supported by their demonstrated ability to operate within territorial waters, utilize multiple coastal locations, and sustain extended operations



Registration and reporting. CSO's and masters are encourage to register their vessels with both MSCIO (<https://mscio.eu/reporting/vessel-registration/>) and UKMTO (<https://www.ukmto.org/reporting-formats/initial-report>) upon entering the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area and report all incidents to UKMTO and MSCIO.

When safe to do so, vessels should document incidents and suspicious activity through logs, photographs, video, and radar footage. CSOs should gather information on Pattern of Life and Maritime Domain Awareness for their planned routes and ports of call to support risk assessments. These procedures enable effective monitoring and resource allocation by CMF and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA.

Contact Information:

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