MSCIO ATALANTA

WEEKLY REPORT

17th Oct – 23th Oct

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OVERVIEW OF INCIDENTS IN THE VOLUNTARY REPORTING AREA (VRA)

CATEGORY	No.	Page Ref.
Armed Robbery	Nil	NSTR
Attack	Nil	NSTR
Attempted Boarding	Nil	NSTR
Boarding	Nil	NSTR
Hijack	Nil	NSTR
Kidnap	Nil	NSTR
Piracy	Nil	NSTR
Suspicious Activity	Nil	NSTR
Other Maritime Crimes	1	2
Total Incidents	1 (note 1)	

Note 1. SOLAS event marked in the map with ▭ is described in page 2.

OTHER MARITIME CRIMES

1. SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS IN THE VRA.

1. 1 TYPE OF INCIDENT: GNSS INTEREFERENCES.
1.2 LOCATION: EVENT 1.
1.3 PERIOD: 18 OCT 2025.
1.4 LOCATION: The Red Sea, next to Port Sudan.
1.5 DURATION: Effects lasted hours and affected different systems which provide GNSS and PNT information.

ANOTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION RELATED WITH GNSS DISRUPTIONS.
To use redundant navigation system or consider additional GNSS receiver can mitigate risks derived from a wrong GNSS in areas affected by this electronic anomaly. Before entering in areas where GNSS interferences are expected, a training process including drills simulating GNSS interferences could reduce risks by reducing time of answer.

More information available in the following links:
MSCIO:
MSC IO | JMIC Advisories Dashboard
MSC IO | UKMTO Weeklies

2. TYPE OF INCIDENT: SOLAS:
2.1 PERIOD: 18 OCT
2.2 LOCATION: EVENT 2
2.3 NAME/IMO SHIP: M/T FALCON (IMO 9014432)
2.4 DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT:
On 18th OCT MT FALCON was abandoned by her crew due to uncontrollable fire 116NM East of Aden. The event is not assessed as Houthis related.
More information available in the following links:
124-jmic-information-note-19_october_2025.pdf

NAVWARN:hydrography.paknavy.gov.pk/wp-content/plugins/navarea-warnings/custom_uploaded_warnings_for_navarea/20251013SEC 474 .txt

OTHER MARITIME CRIMES

1. SUMMARY OF THE GNSS EVENTS REGISTERED BY MSCIO FROM 3RD OCT to 23th OCT 2025.

In the map showed on the right side, a summary of all the events related with GNSS interferences happened during the last three weeks can be consulted.



Although during the last week, there had been a decrease in the number of the GNSS reports, the presence of a single lack of GNSS service in a limited area can provoke a high risk situation. So, MSCIO encourages to masters not only to be ready to face the GNNS interference effects, but also not to trust in the recent low statistics. Consulting some credited open sources, GNSS disruptions are currently being noted in areas such as the Strait of Hormuz, The Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.

More information available in the following links:

UKMTO: 20251024_ukmto_summary_report-24oct25.pdf

JMIC: Weekly Dashboard - draft 29.10

NAVWARN:hydrography.paknavy.gov.pk/wp-content/plugins/navarea-warnings/custom_uploaded_warnings_for_navarea/20251013SEC 474 .txt



OPEN SOURCES: MSC IO | Maritime Cybersecurity Information

MSCIO WEBSITE. USEFUL LINKS

To know more about different maritime security threats, please access to the following links:

MSC IO | Useful Links

1. General Maritime Security:

MSC IO | General Maritime Security

2. Maritime Terrorism:

MSC IO | Maritime Terrorism

3. Piracy Information:

MSC IO | Piracy Information

4. Illegal Traffic and Fishing

MSC IO | Illegal Traffic & Fishing

5. Maritime Cybersecurity Information.

MSC IO | Maritime Cybersecurity Information

6. Submarine Critical Infrastructure.

MSC IO | Submarine Critical Infraestructure



LAST PIRACY RELATED EVENTS (STATUS AND DETAILED DESCRIPTION)

No	Date	Name	MSE Category	Last info
45	7 FEB 25	**FV AL NAJMA**	Armed Robbery	Reported hijacked dhow ivo EYL. 6 hijackers. On 12 Feb, the hijackers left the dhow. No information of any ransom paid was confirmed
46	15 FEB 25	**FV SAYTUUN 2**	Armed Robbery	Reported hijacked vessel ivo EYL. 6 hijackers. On 22 Feb, the hijackers, after stealing the crew's belongings, abandoned the dhow. A ransom has been paid
47	16 MAR 25	**FV AL HIDAYA**	Armed Robbery	Hijack reported off the coast of "DURDURA" South of XAFUN, Somalia - 5 hijackers. After 5 days it was reported that the hijackers left the vessel. According to the Yemeni Authorities no ransom was paid.

Locations of the events 45, 46 and 47 are marked with in pag 7.

Solved or closed cases

Active cases

Unsolved cases

PIRACY STATISTICS (NOV 2023 – OCT 2025)





Pirated (Outside TTW) / Armed Robbery at sea (Inside TTW)
- PAG takes control of the ship and requests a ransom

Piracy Attack
- PAG unsuccessful attack on ship

Hijack
- Attackers boarded and taken control of a ship against the crew's will

Boarding
- Successful attack but pirates do not take control

Suspicious Approach
- Suspicious maneuvering with clear intentions to attack. (weapons clearly displayed)

10/3/2025 | 2

Providing maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean

PIRACY SITUATION (NOV 2023 – OCT 2025)



Higher piracy threat on the coastal areas, based on the capability of PAG operating directly from the coast without mother ship and taking advantage of suitable weather

PIRACY ASSESSMENT

It is **ALMOST CERTAIN** that the PAG's tactics for conducting piracy on the high seas involve hijacking a dhow and using it as a mother ship. The pirates then blend in with the usual traffic and deploy skiffs from the mother ship to attack vessels. They are able to navigate to the high seas, with evidence of events up to 600NM off the East Somali coast.

Nevertheless, from November 2024 it is becoming increasingly common for a group of people to organise themselves, identify a vulnerable ship close to the coast and use skiffs to carry out an attack. These attacks typically target Yemeni fishing dhows for ransom or to be used as motherships.

On the other hand, that risk could be amplified if local fishermen turn into pirates as a consequence that no effective action is being taken from the authorities to safeguard Somali TTW from IUUF (Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated) fishing.

THREAT ASSESSMENT	BENIGN	LOW	MODERATE	SUBSTANTIAL	SEVERE	CRITICAL
YARDSTICK	An attack is **HIGHLY UNLIKELY** (10% – 20%)	An attack is **UNLIKELY** (>25% – 35%)	An attack is a **REALISTIC POSSIBILITY** (40% – <50%)	An attack is **LIKELY / PROBABLE** (55% – <75%)	An attack is **HIGHLY LIKELY** (80% – 90%)	An attack is **ALMOST CERTAIN** (>95%)

PIRACY SITUATION (NOV 2023 – OCT 2025)

PIRACY ASSESSMENT

The PIRACY Threat Assessment (TA) is determined as **LOW** in the GULF OF ADEN and SOMALI BASIN, while it remains MODERATE in the coastal areas from LAASGORAY to the South of TITO.

It is a **REALISTIC POSSIBILITY** that two potential PAGs are active at unknown locations inland in the NE area of PUNTLAND

It is **ALMOST CERTAIN** that there are no PAGs at sea.

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ATALANTA PIRACY THREAT UPDATE

ATALANTA	UPDATE ON THE PIRACY THREAT OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA	23 OCT 2025

Situation: Nothing significant to report

Pirates' modus operandi: The typical pirate strategy involves the seizure and hijacking of a dhow, which is subsequently utilized as a mother ship. The pirates then blend in with the usual traffic and deploy skiffs from the mother ship to attack vessels, navigating as far as 600 Nautical Miles or more, off the East Somali coast. The possibility of Attacks in the Gulf of Aden (GOA) should not be ignored, especially in the Eastern side. After a vessel is seized, it is likely that this is taken to the Somali coast and held there whilst ransom negotiations are ongoing.

REGISTRATION AND REPORTING

Registration and reporting. CSO's and masters are encourage to register their vessels with both MSCIO (**https://mscio.eu/reporting/vessel-registration/**) and UKMTO (**https://www.ukmto.org/reporting-formats/initial-report**) upon entering the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area and report all incidents to UKMTO and MSCIO.

When safe to do so, vessels should document incidents and suspicious activity through logs, photographs, video, and radar footage. CSOs should gather information on Pattern of Life and Maritime Situational Awareness for their planned routes and ports of call to support risk assessments. These procedures enable effective monitoring and resource allocation by CMF and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA.

Contact Information:

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