MSCIO ATALANTA
WEEKLY REPORT

20th Feb – 26th Feb

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EUROPEAN UNION
MSCIO
MARITIME SECURITY CENTRE INDIAN OCEAN

EU NAVFOR
OPERATION ATALANTA

OVERVIEW OF INCIDENTS IN THE VOLUNTARY REPORTING AREA (VRA)

CATEGORY (as per BMP-MS)		No.	Page Ref.
📍	Armed Robbery	Nil	NSTR
📍	Attack	Nil	NSTR
📍	Attempted Boarding	Nil	NSTR
📍	Boarding	Nil	NSTR
📍	Hijack	Nil	NSTR
📍	Kidnap	Nil	NSTR
📍	Piracy	1	Page 3
📍	Suspicious Activity	Nil	NSTR
📍	Other Maritime Crimes	Nil	NSTR
Total Incidents		**1**	

1.1. TYPE OF INCIDENT:

PIRACY *(as per BMP-MS).*

PIRACY ATTACK *(as per MSE categories iaw ATALANTA-CMF*).

1.2. PERIOD: FM 26TH FEB 1833 UTC.

1.3. LOCATION: Off shore Garmaal – Jiifle-Gala'ood, Somalia.

(approx.: 08-27N 05-34E).

2. VESSELS DETAILS.

2.1. ATTACKED VESSEL.

Unknown vessel.

2.2. ATTACKING VESSEL.

Two skiffs.

3. RELEVANT INFORMATION RELATED WITH THE EVENT.

Allegedly, the 26th Feb, two skiffs assessed as suspected pirates departed the Garmaal coastal area and made a board attempt to an Iranian-flagged vessel, highly likely to use it as a mothership.

The vessel's defensive actions prevented the boarding. The skiffs withdrew towards the coast.

Authorities are investigating.

Vessels are strongly advised to avoid transiting through the area, enhance vigilance, implement BMP-MS measures, and report any suspicious activity immediately to MSCIO and UKMTO.

4. ANALYSIS

EUNAVFOR ATALANTA is still investigating the alleged event trying to find relevant evidence.

More information available in the following links:

MSCIO:
MSC IO | Alerts

The following reports were received during the past week. Upon analysis, these events were concluded to be **NOT piracy-related**. Nonetheless, vessels are strongly encouraged to report all incidents and suspicious activity, regardless of their initial classification. Such reporting remains vital, as individual observations are essential for identifying emerging patterns and potential threats. Reports within the VRA should be directed to MSCIO and UKMTO.

1. 24FEB. 1615 UTC.

A MV transiting westbound through the IRTC was approached by a skiff. The craft closed to within approximately 0.7–1.0 NM and maintained a parallel course despite the vessel's evasive maneuvers. In response, the vessel implemented BMP-MS self-protection measures and raised the alarm. The skiff subsequently crossed the vessel's bow and cleared the area. The MV then resumed its transit within the corridor and continued its passage.

2. 25FEB. 0410 UTC.

A MV reported two skiffs operating in the vicinity of a larger mother craft. One skiff conducted a head-on approach, closing to approximately 400 metres before dropping astern and shadowing the vessel briefly. The vessel implemented BMP-MS self-protection measures and continued its passage. No boarding attempt was made, no further suspicious indicators were observed, and no assistance was requested.

3. 25FEB. 1330 UTC.

Two sailing vessels observed two fishing vessels transferring personnel into several skiffs. The skiffs subsequently maneuvered in the vicinity of the sailing vessels, closing to approximately 200 metres. The skiffs then disengaged and departed the area. No weapons or other suspicious indicators were sighted, and no assistance was requested.

To know more about different maritime security threats, please access to the following links:

MSC IO | Useful Links

1. **General Maritime Security:**

MSC IO | General Maritime Security

2. **Maritime Terrorism:**

MSC IO | Maritime Terrorism

3. **Piracy Information:**

MSC IO | Piracy Information

4. **Illegal Traffic and Fishing**

MSC IO | Illegal Traffic & Fishing

5. **Maritime Cybersecurity Information.**

MSC IO | Maritime Cybersecurity Information

    6. **Submarine Critical Infrastructure.**

MSC IO | Critical Undersea Infraestructure

NO	DATE	NAME	MSE CATEGORY	LAST INFO.
53	31 DEC	FV LIAO DONG YU 578	Armed Robbery	Armed robbery reported off the coast of Banderbeyla (Bari Region). FV last known position (LKP) was at anchor. Pending Sat imagery to confirm if the FV is still at anchor in LKP.
54	02 JAN	FV SULTANA 2	Hijack	Alert on IORIS from PMPF. Dhow located off Al- Nushayah. All passengers disembarked. 13JAN Yemen Coast Guard confirmed. RESOLVED after agreement with the vessel's owner. Dhow and crew RELEASED.
55	03 FEB	FV AL-WALEED	Armed Robbery	Received a report from Yemen CG on 03 Feb, that a group of 4 armed men captured a Yemeni 8 meter boat (blue hull) on the coast of Hafun. One fisherman was on board during the capture but was later released. The boat is allegedly taken to Dudura coast. Boat size and engine are not coherent with piracy TTP. Event still pending further investigation.

● Solved or closed cases ● Active cases ● Unsolved cases

PIRACY RELATED EVENTS FROM NOV 23 (56)

Legend:
- SUSPICIOUS APPROACH
- BOARDING
- HIJACK
- ARMED ROBBERY AT SEA
- ATTEMPTED BOARDING
- PIRACY ATTACK/ ARMEM ROBBERY ATTEMPT
- PIRATED

PIRACY RELATED EVENTS FROM 2008

MSE Categories iaw ATALANTA-CMF + INDUSTRY agreement

SUSPICIOUS APPROACH
- Sudden changes of course towards the ship and aggressive behavior. CPA inside 1nm with clear intention to attack and/or weapons clearly displayed.

ATTEMPTED BOARDING
- An Act where the PAG failed to get onboard and gain control of the vessel or members of the crew. Boarding paraphernalia were employed or visible in the approach.

BOARDING
- A boarding in which the attackers have boarded the ship but have NOT taken control.

PIRACY ATTACK/ ARMED ROBERY ATTEMPT
- Ship has been subject to an aggressive approach by unidentified craft and weapons have been discharged. Also, paraphernalia/ tripwires related to piracy, hooks, ladders ect have been reported.

HIJACK
- Attackers have illegally boarded and taken control of a vessel against the crew's will.

PIRATED
- A pirated vessel is a vessel subject to an act that falls under the UNCLOS Article 101 definition of piracy.

ARMED ROBBERY AT SEA
- Any illegal act of violence or detention within a state's internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial seas.

PIRACY ASSESSMENT

It is **ALMOST CERTAIN** that the PAG's tactics for conducting piracy on the high seas involve hijacking a dhow and using it as a mother ship. The pirates then blend in with the usual traffic and deploy skiffs from the mother ship to attack vessels. They are able to navigate to the high seas, with evidence of events up to up to 600 nautical miles off the East Somali coast.

Nevertheless, from November 2024 it is becoming increasingly common for a group of people to organise themselves, identify a vulnerable ship close to the coast and use skiffs to carry out an attack. These attacks typically target Yemeni fishing dhows. While there is no confirmed information, it is **HIGHLY LIKELY** that ransoms would have been paid.

On the other hand, that risk could be amplified if local fishermen turn into pirates as a consequence that no effective action is being taken from the authorities to safeguard Somali TTW from IUUF.

Ransom POSSIBLY paid for the release of the Chinese FV could be a good motivation for activate other PAG.

PIRACY ASSESSMENT

The PIRACY Threat Assessment (TA) is determined as **LOW** in the **GULF OF ADEN**.

Coast of Bari (NE of Somalia) and **East coast from Bari to Galgadud** region remain **MODERATE**.

THREAT ASSESSMENT	BENIGN	LOW	MODERATE	SUBSTANTIAL	SEVERE	CRITICAL
YARDSTICK	An attack is **HIGHLY UNLIKELY** (10% – 20%)	An attack is **UNLIKELY** (>25% – 35%)	An attack is a **REALISTIC POSSIBILITY** (40% – <50%)	An attack is **LIKELY / PROBABLE** (55% – <75%)	An attack is **HIGHLY LIKELY** (80% – 90%)	An attack is **ALMOST CERTAIN** (>95%)

MARITIME SECURITY CENTRE INDIAN OCEAN (MSCIO)
VOLUNTARY REPORTING THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE

WHY TO REPORT

- Improve Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA)
- Enable rapid information-sharing and coordination.
- Support vessels in High Risk Areas.
- Contribute to collective maritime security efforts.

WHAT TO REPORT

- Entry into the Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA).
- Daily position updates.
- Exit from the VRA or arrival at a safe port.
- Suspicious activity or incidents.
- Attacks, attempted or successful.

HOW TO REPORT

- Online: www.mscio.eu
- Email: postmaster@mscio.eu
- Copy UKMTO: watchkeepers@ukmto.com

BENEFITS OF REPORTING

- IMPROVED MONITORING AND PROTECTION DURING TRANSIT -

- ACCESS TO TIMELY THREAT ASSESSMENTS AND SECURITY ALERTS -

- ENHANCED COORDINATION WITH NAVAL FORCES OPERATING IN THE REGION -

Your report strengthens maritime security across the Indian Ocean and Red Sea

REGISTRATION AND REPORTING.

CSO's and Masters are encouraged to register their vessels upon entering the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area with both:

- MSCIO (**https://mscio.eu/reporting/vessel-registration/**)

- UKMTO (**https://www.ukmto.org/reporting-formats/initial-report**)

And to report all incidents to UKMTO and MSCIO.

When safe to do so, vessels should document incidents and suspicious activity through logs, photographs, video, and radar footage. CSOs should gather information on Pattern of Life and Maritime Situational Awareness for their planned routes and ports of call to support risk assessments. These procedures enable effective monitoring and resource allocation by CMF and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA.

Contact Information (MSCIO):

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