



# MSCIO ATALANTA

# WEEKLY REPORT

## 22 Aug – 28 Aug

postmaster@mscio.eu

0033 (0) 298 220 220

https://mscio.eu/

0033 (0) 298 220 170

# OVERVIEW OF INCIDENTS IN THE VOLUNTARY REPORTING AREA (VRA)


| CATEGORY | No. | Page Ref. |
|---|---|---|
| Armed Robbery | Nil | NSTR |
| Attack | Nil | NSTR |
| Attempted Boarding | Nil | NSTR |
| Boarding | Nil | NSTR |
| Hijack | Nil | NSTR |
| Kidnap | Nil | NSTR |
| Piracy | Nil | NSTR |
| Suspicious Activity | Nil | NSTR |
| Other Maritime Crimes | 2 | 2-3 |
| **Total Incidents** | 0 | |

# OTHER MARITIME CRIMES

**1. SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS IN THE VRA.**

**1. 1 TYPE OF INCIDENT: GNSS INTERFERENCES.**

**1.2 PERIOD: 22 AUG to 28 AUG 2025.**

**1.3 LOCATION: the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea.**

**1.4 DURATION: Effects lasted hours and affected different systems which provide GNSS and PNT information.**

**2. ANOTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION RELATED WITH GNSS DISRUPTIONS.**

**During this week, MSCIO has received reports sent by masters informing about GNSS disruption effects in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea areas. Seafarers are strongly advised to be aware of this issue and navigate with precaution.**

**To use redundant navigation system or consider additional GNSS receiver can mitigate risks derived from a wrong GNSS in areas affected by this electronic anomaly. Previous to enter in areas where GNSS interferences are expected, a review of internal procedures and a training process including drills simulating GNSS interferences could reduce risks by reducing time of answer.**


**More info about virtual threats:**
[bmp-ms-2025-final-hi-res.pdf]

# OTHER MARITIME CRIMES

**1. SUMMARY OF THE GNSS EVENTS REGISTERED BY MSCIO FROM 08 TO 28 AUG 2025.**

**In the map showed on the right side, a summary of all the events related with GNSS interferences happened during the last three weeks can be consulted.**




**Read note 2.**

**Although during the last three weeks, MSCIO has noticed a decrease in the number of the GNSS reports, the presence of a single lack of GNSS service in a limited area can provoke a high risk situation. So, MSCIO encourages to masters not only to be ready to face the GNNS disruption effects, but also not to trust in the recent low statistics.**

**More information available in the following links:**
**MSCIO:** MSC IO | Weekly Threat Assessment
MSC IO | Alerts
**UKMTO:** 20250829_ukmto_summary_report-29aug25.pdf
**JMIC:** JMIC Week 34 Dashboard 18 August - 24 August 2025 (2).pdf
**OPEN SOURCES**: Protect satellite navigation from interference, UN agencies urge



# LAST PIRACY RELATED EVENTS (STATUS AND DETAILED DESCRIPTION)

| No | Date | Name | MSE Category | Last info |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 45 | 7 FEB | **FV AL NAJMA** | Armed Robbery | Reported hijacked dhow ivo EYL. 6 hijackers. On 12 Feb, the hijackers left the dhow. No information of any ransom paid was confirmed |
| 46 | 15 FEB | **FV SAYTUUN 2** | Armed Robbery | Reported hijacked vessel ivo EYL. 6 hijackers. On 22 Feb, the hijackers, after stealing the crew's belongings, abandoned the dhow. A ransom has been paid |
| 47 | 16 MAR | **FV AL HIDAYA** | Armed Robbery | Hijack reported off the coast of "DURDURA" South of XAFUN, Somalia - 5 hijackers. After 5 days it was reported that the hijackers left the vessel. According to the Yemeni Authorities no ransom was paid. |

**Locations of the events 45, 46 and 47 are marked with in pag 6.**

Solved or closed cases

Active cases

Unsolved cases

# PIRACY STATISTICS (NOV 2023 – AUG 2025)







**Pirated (Outside TTW) / Armed Robbery at sea (Inside TTW)**
- PAG takes control of the ship and requests a ransom

**Piracy Attack**
- PAG unsuccessful attack on ship

**Hijack**
- Attackers boarded and taken control of a ship against the crew's will

**Boarding**
- Successful attack but pirates do not take control

**Suspicious Approach**
- Suspicious maneuvering with clear intentions to attack. (weapons clearly displayed)

8/14/2025 | 2

*Providing maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean*

# PIRACY SITUATION (NOV 2023 – AUG 2025)




Higher piracy threat on the coastal areas, based on the capability of PAG operating directly from the coast without mother ship and taking advantage of suitable weather

Fishing dispute area

## PIRACY ASSESSMENT

It is **ALMOST CERTAIN** that the PAGs (Pirate Action Groups) tactics for conducting piracy on the high seas involve hijacking a dhow and using it as a mother ship. The pirates then blend in with the usual traffic and deploy skiffs from the mother ship to attack vessels. They are able to navigate up to 600 nautical miles or more off the East Somali coast.

Nevertheless, from November 2024 it is becoming increasingly common for a group of people to organise themselves, identify a vulnerable ship close to the coast and use skiffs to carry out an attack. These attacks typically target Yemeni fishing dhows. While there is no confirmed information, it is **HIGHLY LIKELY** that ransoms would have been paid.

On the other hand, that risk could be amplified if local fishermen turn into pirates as a consequence that no effective action is being taken from the authorities to safeguard the Somali TTW from IUU (Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated) fishing.

| THREAT ASSESSMENT | BENIGN | LOW | MODERATE | SUBSTANTIAL | SEVERE | CRITICAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| YARDSTICK | An attack is HIGHLY UNLIKELY (10% – 20%) | An attack is UNLIKELY (>25% – 35%) | An attack is a REALISTIC POSSIBILITY (40% – <50%) | An attack is LIKELY / PROBABLE (55% – <75%) | An attack is HIGHLY LIKELY (80% – 90%) | An attack is ALMOST CERTAIN (>95%) |

# PIRACY SITUATION (NOV 2023 – AUG 2025)

## PIRACY ASSESSMENT

The PIRACY Threat Assessment (TA) is determined as **LOW** in the GULF OF ADEN and SOMALI BASIN, while it remains **MODERATE** in the coastal areas from LAASGORAY to the South of TITO.

It is a **REALISTIC POSSIBILITY** that two potential PAGs are active at unknown locations inland in the NE area of PUNTLAND

It is **ALMOST CERTAIN** that there are no PAGs at sea.


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# ATALANTA PIRACY THREAT UPDATE

| ATALANTA | UPDATE ON THE PIRACY THREAT OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA | 28 AUG 2025 |
|---|---|---|

**Situation:** Nothing significant to report

**Pirates' modus operandi:** The typical pirate strategy involves the seizure and hijacking of a dhow, which is subsequently utilized as a mother ship. The pirates then blend in with the usual traffic and deploy skiffs from the mother ship to attack vessels, navigating as far as 600 Nautical Miles or more, off the East Somali coast. The possibility of Attacks in the Gulf of Aden (GOA) should not be ignored, especially in the Eastern side. After a vessel is seized, it is likely that this is taken to the Somali coast and held there whilst ransom negotiations are ongoing.

# REGISTRATION AND REPORTING

**Registration and reporting**. CSO's and masters are encourage to register their vessels with both MSCIO **(**https://mscio.eu/reporting/vessel-registration/**)** and UKMTO **(**https://www.ukmto.org/reporting-formats/initial-report**)** upon entering the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area and report all incidents to UKMTO and MSCIO.

When safe to do so, vessels should document incidents and suspicious activity through logs, photographs, video, and radar footage. CSOs should gather information on Pattern of Life and Maritime Situational Awareness for their planned routes and ports of call to support risk assessments. These procedures enable effective monitoring and resource allocation by CMF and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA.

**Contact Information:**

**MSCIO:**

**Tel: 0033 (0) 298 220 220 // 0033 (0) 298 220 170**

**Website: www.mscio.eu**

**Email: postmaster@mscio.eu**