MSCIO ATALANTA

WEEKLY REPORT

24th Oct – 30th Oct

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OVERVIEW OF INCIDENTS IN THE VOLUNTARY REPORTING AREA (VRA)

CATEGORY	No.	Page Ref.
Armed Robbery	1	2
Attack	Nil	NSTR
Attempted Boarding	Nil	NSTR
Boarding	Nil	NSTR
Hijack	Nil	NSTR
Kidnap	Nil	NSTR
Piracy	Nil	NSTR
Suspicious Activity	Nil	NSTR
Other Maritime Crimes	1	3
Total Incidents	2	

ARMED ROBBERY

1. SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS IN THE VRA.

1.1. TYPE OF INCIDENT: ARMED ROBBERY.

1.2. PERIOD: ONGOING.

1.3. LOCATION: Garacad area (Somalian coast).

1.4. DURATION: ONGOING.

2. VESSEL DETAILS.

Possible Vessel Name: Al Soheyl / Al Sohel / Mohamedi (Reg No: "3/14055").
Crew on board: 19.
Type of Vessel: Fishing Dhow.

3. RELEVANT INFORMATION RELATED WITH THE EVENT.

On 28th Oct 25, an unknown number of unidentified elements hijacked one Iranian-flagged Dhow near Garacad area, Somalia. Its current holding location is undetermined. Although the case is still under investigation by EUNAVFOR ATALANTA and more information is yet to be gathered, it is probable that the intention of hijackers could be to reach high sea and attack M/Vs.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS:
Vessels are requested to remain vigilant and to adhere to BMP Maritime Security when transiting the Western Indian Ocean and the Somali waters.

More information available in the following links:

MSCIO:
MSC IO | Alerts
20251028-Industry_Releasable_Threat_Bulletin_047.pdf
UKMTO:
20251028-UKMTO_ADVISORY_037-25

OTHER MARITIME CRIMES

1. SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS IN THE VRA.

1.1. TYPE OF INCIDENT: GNSS INTERFERENCE.

1.2 PERIOD: 23 OCT 2025.

1.3 LOCATION: The Red Sea.

1.4 DURATION: Effects lasted hours and affected different systems which provide GNSS and PNT information.

2. ANOTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION RELATED WITH GNSS DISRUPTIONS.

During this week, MSCIO has received one direct report related with GNSS disruption effects in the Red Sea. Seafarers are strongly advised to be aware of this issue and navigate with precaution.

Using redundant navigation system or considering the use of additional GNSS receiver can mitigate risks derived from a wrong GNSS in areas affected by this electronic anomaly. Previous to enter in areas where GNSS interferences are expected, a training process including drills simulating GNSS interferences could mitigate risks by reducing time of answer.

More information available in the following links:

MSCIO:
MSC IO | Alerts
JMIC:
JMIC Week 43 Dashboard 20 October - 26 October 2025
UKMTO:
20251024_UKMTO_Summary_Report-18-24Oct25

NAVWARN:hydrography.paknavy.gov.pk/wp-content/plugins/navarea-warnings/custom_uploaded_warnings_for_navarea/20251013SEC 474 .txt

SUMMARY GNSS EVENTS

1. SUMMARY OF THE GNSS EVENTS REGISTERED BY MSCIO FROM 10th OCT to 30th OCT 2025.

In the map showed on the right side, a summary of all the events related with GNSS interferences happened during the last three weeks can be consulted.



Source: Reports sent by masters to MSCIO

Although there has been a decrease in the number of the GNSS reports during last week, the presence of a single lack of GNSS service in a limited area can provoke a high risk situation. Therefore, MSCIO encourages masters not only to be ready to face the GNNS interference effects, but also not trust in recent low statistics. Credited open sources show that GNSS disruptions are currently being noted in areas such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.



More information available in the following links:

NAVWARN:hydrography.paknavy.gov.pk/wp-content/plugins/navarea-warnings/custom_uploaded_warnings_for_navarea/20251013SEC 474 .txt

OPEN SOURCES: [MSC IO | Maritime Cybersecurity Information]

MSCIO WEBSITE. USEFUL LINKS

To know more about different maritime security threats, please access to the following links:

MSC IO | Useful Links

1. General Maritime Security:

MSC IO | General Maritime Security

2. Maritime Terrorism:

MSC IO | Maritime Terrorism

3. Piracy Information:

MSC IO | Piracy Information

4. Illegal Traffic and Fishing

MSC IO | Illegal Traffic & Fishing

5. Maritime Cybersecurity Information.

MSC IO | Maritime Cybersecurity Information

6. Submarine Critical Infrastructure.

MSC IO | Submarine Critical Infraestructure



LAST PIRACY RELATED EVENTS (STATUS AND DETAILED DESCRIPTION)

No	Date	Name	MSE Category	LAST INFORMATION
45	7 FEB 25	**FV AL NAJMA**	Armed Robbery	Reported hijacked dhow ivo EYL. 6 hijackers. On 12 Feb, the hijackers left the dhow. No information of any ransom paid was confirmed
46	15 FEB 25	**FV SAYTUUN 2**	Armed Robbery	Reported hijacked vessel ivo EYL. 6 hijackers. On 22 Feb, the hijackers, after stealing the crew's belongings, abandoned the dhow. A ransom has been paid
47	16 MAR 25	**FV AL HIDAYA**	Armed Robbery	Hijack reported off the coast of "DURDURA" South of XAFUN, Somalia - 5 hijackers. After 5 days it was reported that the hijackers left the vessel. According to the Yemeni Authorities no ransom was paid.
48	28 OCT 25	**IRANIAN DHOW**	Armed Robbery	Hijack reported off the coast of Garacad.

Locations of the events 45, 46, 47 AND 48 are marked with **in page 8.**

- *Solved or closed cases*
- *Active cases*
- *Unsolved cases*

PIRACY STATISTICS (NOV 2023 – OCT 2025)





Pirated (Outside TTW) / Armed Robbery at sea (Inside TTW)
- PAG takes control of the ship and requests a ransom

Piracy Attack
- PAG unsuccessful attack on ship

Hijack
- Attackers boarded and taken control of a ship against the crew's will

Boarding
- Successful attack but pirates do not take control

Suspicious Approach
- Suspicious maneuvering with clear intentions to attack. (weapons clearly displayed)

PIRACY SITUATION (NOV 2023 – OCT 2025)



Higher piracy threat
based on the capability of PAG operating directly from the coastal without mother ship and suitable weather.

PIRACY ASSESSMENT

It is **ALMOST CERTAIN** that the PAG's tactics for conducting piracy on the high seas involve hijacking a dhow and using it as a mother ship. The pirates then blend in with the usual traffic and deploy skiffs from the mother ship to attack vessels. They are able to navigate to the high seas, with evidence of events up to up to 600 nautical miles off the East Somali coast.

Nevertheless, from November 2024 it is becoming increasingly common for a group of people to organise themselves, identify a vulnerable ship close to the coast and use skiffs to carry out an attack. These attacks typically target Yemeni fishing dhows. While there is no confirmed information, it is HIGHLY LIKELY that ransoms would have been paid.

On the other hand, that risk could be amplified if local fishermen turn into pirates as a consequence that no effective action is being taken from the authorities to safeguard Somali TTW from IUUF.

THREAT ASSESSMENT	BENIGN	LOW	MODERATE	SUBSTANTIAL	SEVERE	CRITICAL
YARDSTICK	An attack is **HIGHLY UNLIKELY** (10% – 20%)	An attack is **UNLIKELY** (>25% – 35%)	An attack is a **REALISTIC POSSIBILITY** (40% – <50%)	An attack is **LIKELY / PROBABLE** (55% – <75%)	An attack is **HIGHLY LIKELY** (80% – 90%)	An attack is **ALMOST CERTAIN** (>95%)

ATALANTA PIRACY THREAT UPDATE

PIRACY ASSESSMENT

The PIRACY Threat Assessment (TA) is determined as **LOW** in the GULF OF ADEN, while **in the coastal areas from BEREEDA to MEREEG,** has changed to **SUBSTANTIAL up to 100 NM into Somali Basin.**

It is a **LIKELY** that a PAGs is active in the vicinity of GARACAD port having hijacked an Iranian flagged Dhow on 28 October 2025**.**

In the coastal areas in the North of Somalia from LAASGORAY to BEREEDA remain **MODERATE**.



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REGISTRATION AND REPORTING

Registration and reporting.

CSO's and masters are encouraged to register their vessels upon entering the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area with both:

- MSCIO **(https://mscio.eu/reporting/vessel-registration/)**

- UKMTO **(https://www.ukmto.org/reporting-formats/initial-report)**

And report all incidents to UKMTO and MSCIO.

When safe to do so, vessels should document incidents and suspicious activity through logs, photographs, video, and radar footage. CSOs should gather information on Pattern of Life and Maritime Situational Awareness for their planned routes and ports of call to support risk assessments. These procedures enable effective monitoring and resource allocation by CMF and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA.

Contact Information (MSCIO):

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