





MSCIO ATALANTA WEEKLY REPORT

25 Jul – 31 Jul

 postmaster@mscio.eu










 **0033 (0) 298 220 220**

 <https://mscio.eu/>

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OVERVIEW OF INCIDENTS IN THE VOLUNTARY REPORTING AREA (VRA)



CATEGORY	No.	Page Ref.
 Armed Robbery	Nil	NSTR
 Attack	Nil	NSTR
 Attempted Boarding	Nil	NSTR
 Boarding	Nil	NSTR
 Hijack	Nil	NSTR
 Kidnap	Nil	NSTR
 Piracy	Nil	NSTR
 Suspicious Activity	Nil	NSTR
 Other Maritime Crimes	2	2
Total Incidents	1 (Note 1)	

Note 1: The events described in page 3 are considered as a whole since they are consecutive reports related with GNSS interferences affecting to the same area since 25 Jul to 31 Jul 25.



OTHER MARITIME CRIMES

1. SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS IN THE VRA.

1. 1 TYPE OF INCIDENT: GNSS INTERFERENCES.

1.2 PERIOD: 25 JUL to 31 JUL 2025.

1.3 LOCATION: the Strait of Hormuz, the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.

1.4 DURATION: Effects lasted hours and affected different systems which provide GNSS and PNT information.

2. ANOTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION RELATED WITH GNSS DISRUPTIONS.

During this week, MSCIO continues receiving ship reports related with GNSS disruption effects in the Strait of Hormuz, the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman areas. Seafarers are strongly advised to be aware of this issue and navigate with precaution.

To use redundant navigation system or consider additional GNSS receiver can mitigate risks derived from a wrong GNSS in areas affected by this electronic anomaly. Previous to enter in areas where GNSS interferences are expected, a training process including drills simulating GNSS interferences could reduce risks by reducing time of answer.

More information available in the following links:

UKMTO: [Recent Incidents Advisory #23](#)

[20250801 UKMTO Summary Report-01Aug25 \(1\).pdf](#)

MSCIO: [MSC IO | Weekly Threat Assessment](#)

[MSC IO | Alerts](#)

JMIC: [JMIC Week 30 Dashboard 21 JULY - 27 JULY 2025.pdf](#)

NAVAREA: [hydrography.paknavy.gov.pk/wp-content/plugins/navarea-warnings/custom_uploaded_warnings_for_navarea/20250618SEC 294.txt](#)





OTHER MARITIME CRIMES

1. SUMMARY OF THE GNSS EVENTS REGISTERED IN MSCIO FROM 20 JUN TO 31 JUL 2025.


In the map showed on the right side, a summary of all the events related with GNSS interferences happened during the last four weeks can be consulted.

GNSS events reported to MSCIO



Read note 2

Although it seems that GNSS interferences could be reaching a level as it was before the conflict in the area (The Persian Gulf, The Arabian Sea and SoH), the reports continue showing that the effects are noticed in an extensive area. In accordance JMIC Weekly Dashboard for the Middle East ([JMIC Week 30 Dashboard 21 JULY - 27 JULY 2025 \(1\).pdf](#)), "the EMI (Electro Magnetic Interference) is likely to stem from Iranian coastlines and can affect large swathes of the AG".



More info about virtual threats: [bmp-ms-2025-final-hi-res.pdf](#)



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LAST PIRACY RELATED EVENTS (STATUS AND DETAILED DESCRIPTION)

No	Date	Name	MSE Category	Last info
45	7 FEB	FV AL NAJMA	Armed Robbery	Reported hijacked dhow ivo EYL. 6 hijackers. On 12 Feb, the hijackers left the dhow. No information of any ransom paid was confirmed
46	15 FEB	FV SAYTUUN 2	Armed Robbery	Reported hijacked vessel ivo EYL. 6 hijackers. On 22 Feb, the hijackers, after stealing the crew's belongings, abandoned the dhow. A ransom has been paid.
47	16 MAR	FV AL HIDAYA	Armed Robbery	Hijack reported off the coast of "DURDURA" South of XAFUN, Somalia , 5 hijackers. After 5 days it was reported that the hijackers left the vessel. According to the Yemeni Authorities no ransom was paid. Following the release of the vessel, an Operation Atalanta asset approached the vessel and conducted interviews with the crew

Locations of the events 45, 46 and 47 are marked with  in pag 6.

 Solved or closed cases

 Active cases

 Unsolved cases




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
PIRACY STATISTICS (NOV 2023 – JUL 2025)

47 Events



7/4/2025 | 2

MARITIME SECURITY EVENTS



Pirated (Outside TTW) / Armed Robbery at sea (Inside TTW)

• PAG takes control of the ship and requests a ransom

Piracy Attack

• PAG unsuccessful attack on ship

Hijack

• Attackers boarded and taken control of a ship against the crew's will

Boarding

• Successful attack but pirates do not take control

Suspicious Approach

• Suspicious maneuvering with clear intentions to attack. (weapons clearly displayed)

Providing maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean




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PIRACY SITUATION (NOV 2023 – JUL 2025)



PIRACY ASSESSMENT

It is **ALMOST CERTAIN** that the PAG's tactics for conducting piracy on the high seas involve hijacking a dhow and using it as a mother ship. The pirates then blend in with the usual traffic and deploy skiffs from the mother ship to attack vessels. They are able to navigate to the high seas, with evidence of events up to 600NM off the East Somali coast.

Nevertheless, from November 2024 it is becoming increasingly common for a group of people to organise themselves, identify a vulnerable ship close to the coast and use skiffs to carry out an attack. These attacks typically target Yemeni fishing dhows for ransom or to be used as motherships.

On the other hand, that risk could be amplified if local fishermen turn into pirates as a consequence that no effective action is being taken from the authorities to safeguard the Somali TTW from IUUF (Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing).

THREAT ASSESSMENT	BENIGN	LOW	MODERATE	SUBSTANTIAL	SEVERE	CRITICAL
YARDSTICK	An attack is HIGHLY UNLIKELY (10% – 20%)	An attack is UNLIKELY (25% – 35%)	An attack is a REALISTIC POSSIBILITY (40% – 50%)	An attack is LIKELY / PROBABLE (55% – 75%)	An attack is HIGHLY LIKELY (80% – 90%)	An attack is ALMOST CERTAIN (90%+)



PIRACY SITUATION (NOV 2023 – JUL 2025)

PIRACY ASSESSMENT

The PIRACY Threat Assessment (TA) is determined as **LOW** in the GULF OF ADEN and SOMALI BASIN, while it remains **MODERATE** in the coastal areas from LAASGORAY to the South of TITO.

It is a **REALISTIC POSSIBILITY** that two potential PAGs are active at unknown locations inland in the NE area of PUNTLAND.

It is **ALMOST CERTAIN** that there are no PAGs at sea.



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ATALANTA PIRACY THREAT UPDATE

ATALANTA	UPDATE ON THE PIRACY THREAT OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA	31 JUL 2025
<p>Situation: Nothing significant to report</p> <p>Pirates' modus operandi: The typical pirate strategy involves the seizure and hijacking of a dhow, which is subsequently utilized as a mother ship. The pirates then blend in with the usual traffic and deploy skiffs from the mother ship to attack vessels, navigating as far as 600 Nautical Miles or more, off the East Somali coast. The possibility of Attacks in the Gulf of Aden (GOA) should not be ignored, especially in the Eastern side. After a vessel is seized, it is likely that this is taken to the Somali coast and held there whilst ransom negotiations are ongoing</p>		



REGISTRATION AND REPORTING

Registration and reporting. CSO's and masters are encourage to register their vessels with both MSCIO (<https://mscio.eu/reporting/vessel-registration/>) and UKMTO (<https://www.ukmto.org/reporting-formats/initial-report>) upon entering the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area and report all incidents to UKMTO and MSCIO.

When safe to do so, vessels should document incidents and suspicious activity through logs, photographs, video, and radar footage. CSOs should gather information on Pattern of Life and Maritime Domain Awareness for their planned routes and ports of call to support risk assessments. These procedures enable effective monitoring and resource allocation by CMF and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA.

Contact Information:

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