





# MSCIO ATALANTA WEEKLY REPORT

27th Mar – 02nd Apr

 [postmaster@mscio.eu](mailto:postmaster@mscio.eu)


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 <https://mscio.eu/>

 0033 (0) 298 220 170




# OVERVIEW OF INCIDENTS IN THE VOLUNTARY REPORTING AREA (VRA)



CATEGORY		No.	Page Ref.
	Armed Robbery	Nil	NSTR
	Attack	Nil	NSTR
	Attempted Boarding	Nil	NSTR
	Boarding	Nil	NSTR
	Hijack	Nil	NSTR
	Kidnap	Nil	NSTR
	Piracy	1	<a href="#">Slide 6</a>
	Suspicious Activity	4	<a href="#">Slide 3</a>
	Other Maritime Crimes	Nil	NSTR
<b>Total Incidents</b>		<b>5</b>	

# OVERVIEW OF INCIDENTS IN THE AS/SoH/GoO



More detailed information can be found in:  
[MSCIO EU | Advisories](#)

EVENTS FROM 27MAR-02APR			
NUMBER	DATE	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION
28	31MAR	26-12N 051-34E	A tanker was struck by two projectiles. One caused a fire which has since been extinguished. The other remains unexploded within the vessels engine room and is being investigated by the relevant authorities.
27	30MAR	25-30N 054-52E	A tanker has reportedly been struck by an unknown projectile approximately 27Nm from Dubai, causing a fire on board. The crew is reported to be safe.
26	30MAR	26-45N 050-30E	A merchant vessel has reported two projectile impacts in close proximity while underway, approximately 30 NM northeast of Dammam, Saudi Arabia. The crew is reported to be safe, and no structural damage has been identified at this stage.
25	28MAR	19-22N 058-35E	A ship has reportedly been struck by an UAV that did not explode, when she was 40NM SE from Duqm (Oman). The crew is reported to be safe and the ship suffered only minor damage in the funnel. A specialist team is proceeding to handle the unexploded warhead.



## ASSESSMENT AND GUIDANCE FOR AS/SoH/GoO

- Military operations keep ongoing in the region and the maritime security environment in the Strait of Hormuz and adjacent waters remains highly deteriorated.
- There is a risk of being affected by falling debris resulting from missile or drone interceptions, as well as the possibility that munitions may fail to detonate, resulting in unexploded ordnance (UXO) on board. Masters are advised to follow the post-incident and unexploded ordnance procedures outlined in BMP-MS.
- Due to current high threat level, **TRANSIT THROUGH THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ REMAINS NOT RECOMMENDED.**
- GNSS/AIS spoofing levels inside the Arabian Gulf, SoH and Gulf of Oman have decreased, however, intermittent disruptions are still reported.
- It is advised for merchant vessels to:
  - ✓ Avoid transiting the Strait of Hormuz until the security situation improves.
  - ✓ Adhere to guidance issued by their Flag State or competent national authorities when considering transit.
  - ✓ Perform enhanced risk assessment.
  - ✓ Strictly adhere to BMP-MS.
  - ✓ Monitor Ch16 VHF and be prepared to be hailed.
  - ✓ Use AIS as per company policy.
  - ✓ Whenever possible, increase distance from any naval forces to mitigate risk.
  - ✓ Enhance radar and landmark procedures to support safe navigation, since GNSS are likely to be unreliable.
  - ✓ Be prepared to rely on dead-reckoning navigation.



## ASSESSMENT AND GUIDANCE FOR RED SEA/BeM

- The potential for the resumption of hostile activity by Iranian-aligned Houthi forces against commercial shipping in the Red Sea and adjacent approaches remains active.
- Currently, no Houthi attacks have been reported in the maritime domain.
- Merchant vessels should expect:
  - Higher exposure for vessels with certain affiliations.
  - Potential delays for vessels requesting close protection.
- It is advised for merchant vessels to:
  - Maintain navigation through international waters for as long as possible.
  - Navigate closer to the African coastline where feasible.
  - Maintain coordination with maritime security reporting centers, both MSCIO and UKMTO.
  - Conduct a voyage-specific risk assessment and adhere to BMP-MS.
  - Before transiting the area, take into consideration any direct or indirect affiliations between the vessel, its ownership, or its cargo and countries of interest.
- Reports indicate GNSS/GPS disruption in the central Red Sea. Vessels may experience degradation or loss of satellite navigation signals. Masters are advised to exercise caution and verify position using alternative navigation methods.

**1.1. TYPE OF INCIDENT:** PIRACY.

**1.2. PERIOD:** FM 24<sup>TH</sup> MAR 0700 UTC. ONGOING.

**1.3. LOCATION:** 350NM NE Mogadishu, Somalia.

## 2. VESSELS DETAILS.

Fishing vessel - Iranian type dhow named "AL WASEEMI 786".

## 3. RELEVANT INFORMATION RELATED WITH THE EVENT.

A pirate action group (PAG), consisting of an unknown number of pirates, hijacked an Iranian-flagged fishing vessel (dhow) named "AL WASEEMI 786", approximately 400NM East of Mogadishu.

Preliminary indicators suggested the incident as highly likely an opportunistic hijacking intended to repurpose the dhow as a mothership to facilitate subsequent piracy operations.

EUNAVFOR ATALANTA located the dhow while it was transiting through the Somali Basin and has been closely monitoring it since. Currently, the dhow is in the Dhinowda area, under monitoring by EUNAVFOR ATALANTA assets, and does not pose a threat to merchant shipping.

MSCIO will provide updates through [MSCIO website](#) as further information becomes available.

### More information available in the following links:

MSCIO:

[MSC IO | Alerts](#)

[MSC IO | IRTB Industry Releasable Threat Bulletin](#)





## MARITIME SECURITY EVENTS RELATED TO PIRACY (STATUS AND DETAILED DESCRIPTION FROM JAN 2026)





No	Date	Name	MSE Category	Last info.
54	31 DEC	FV LIAO DONG YU 578	Armed Robbery	Armed robbery reported off the coast of Banderbeyla (Bari Region). PSP has informed that the Vessel has been released near Ceel Dhidar, Bandarbeyla district. According to local credible sources, a ransom of 1.2 USD was paid.
55	02 JAN	FV SULTANA 2	Hijack	Alert on IORIS from PMPF. Dhow located off Al- Nushayah. All passengers disembarked. 13JAN Yemen Coast Guard confirmed. RESOLVED after agreement with the vessel's owner. Dhow and crew RELEASED
56	03 FEB	FV AL-WALEED	Armed Robbery	Received a report from Yemen CG on 03 Feb, that a group of 4 armed men captured a Yemeni 8 meter boat (blue hull) on the coast of Hafun. One fisherman was on board during the capture but was later released. The boat is allegedly taken to Dudura coast. Boat size and engine are not coherent with piracy TTP. Event still pending further investigation.
57	26 FEB	UNKNOWN	Piracy Attack	PMPF has reported that two skiffs attempted attacking an Iranian flagged vessel. The vessels defensive actions prevented the boarding. One attacker reportedly killed and two injured. Initial information from LNO MOG and Puntland police, the PAG composition is 9 pirates. PMPF has also allegedly arrested 3 pirates and taken in custody 1 of the 2 skiffs.
58	24 MAR	AL WASEEMI 786	Pirated	Received a report that Iranian dhow "AL WASEEMI 786" with 24 crew members was pirated on the 19 of March aprox 400nm from Mogadishu. The PAG group consisting of a number between 10 and 15 pirates. No injuries reported.


● Solved or closed cases ● Active cases

# PIRACY STATISTICS (NOV 2023 – MAR 2026)

## PIRACY RELATED EVENTS FROM NOV 2023 (58)



## PIRACY ASSESSMENT



It is **ALMOST CERTAIN** that the PAG's tactics for conducting piracy on the high seas involve hijacking a dhow and using it as a mother ship. The pirates then blend in with the usual traffic and deploy skiffs from the mother ship to attack vessels. They are able to navigate to the high seas, with evidence of events up to up to 600 nautical miles off the East Somali coast.

Nevertheless, from November 2024 it is becoming increasingly common for a group of people to organise themselves, identify a vulnerable ship close to the coast and use skiffs to carry out an attack. These attacks typically target Yemeni fishing dhows. While there is no confirmed information, it is **HIGHLY LIKELY** that ransoms would have been paid.

On the other hand, that risk could be amplified if local fishermen turn into pirates as a consequence that no effective action is being taken from the authorities to safeguard Somali TTW from IUUF.

It is **ALMOST CERTAIN** that the ransom paid for the LIAO DONG YU will set a bad example for other pirate groups trying to imitate that operation.

# ATALANTA PIRACY THREAT UPDATE

## PIRACY ASSESSMENT

The PIRACY Threat Assessment (TA) is determined as:

- **SUBSTANTIAL** from Puntland to Jubaland coastal areal (Eastern Somali Coast).
- **LOW** in the remaining areas.



THREAT ASSESSMENT	BENIGN	LOW	MODERATE	SUBSTANTIAL	SEVERE	CRITICAL
YARDSTICK	An attack is <b>HIGHLY UNLIKELY</b> (10% – 20%)	An attack is <b>UNLIKELY</b> (>25% – 35%)	An attack is a <b>REALISTIC POSSIBILITY</b> (40% – <50%)	An attack is <b>LIKELY / PROBABLE</b> (55% – <75%)	An attack is <b>HIGHLY LIKELY</b> (80% – 90%)	An attack is <b>ALMOST CERTAIN</b> (>95%)

# MARITIME SECURITY CENTRE INDIAN OCEAN (MSCIO)

VOLUNTARY REPORTING THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE



## WHY TO REPORT

- Improve Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA)
- Enable rapid information-sharing and coordination.
- Support vessels in High Risk Areas.
- Contribute to collective maritime security efforts.

## WHAT TO REPORT

- Entry into the Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA).
- Daily position updates.
- Exit from the VRA or arrival at a safe port.
- Suspicious activity or incidents.
- Attacks, attempted or successful.

## HOW TO REPORT

- Online: [www.mscio.eu](http://www.mscio.eu)
- Email: [postmaster@mscio.eu](mailto:postmaster@mscio.eu)
- Copy UKMTO: [watchkeepers@ukmto.com](mailto:watchkeepers@ukmto.com)

## BENEFITS OF REPORTING

- IMPROVED MONITORING AND PROTECTION DURING TRANSIT -
- ACCESS TO TIMELY THREAT ASSESSMENTS AND SECURITY ALERTS -
- ENHANCED COORDINATION WITH NAVAL FORCES OPERATING IN THE REGION -

**Your report strengthens maritime security across the Indian Ocean and Red Sea**



## REGISTRATION AND REPORTING

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CSO's and Masters are encouraged to register their vessels upon entering the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area with both:

- MSCIO (<https://mscio.eu/reporting/vessel-registration/>)
- UKMTO (<https://www.ukmto.org/reporting-formats/initial-report>)

And to report all incidents to UKMTO and MSCIO.

When safe to do so, vessels should document incidents and suspicious activity through logs, photographs, video, and radar footage. CSOs should gather information on Pattern of Life and Maritime Situational Awareness for their planned routes and ports of call to support risk assessments. These procedures enable effective monitoring and resource allocation by CMF and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA.

### Contact Information (MSCIO):

Tel: 0033 (0) 298 220 220 // 0033 (0) 298 220 170

Website: [www.mscio.eu](http://www.mscio.eu)

Email: [postmaster@mscio.eu](mailto:postmaster@mscio.eu)