MSCIO ATALANTA

WEEKLY REPORT

29 Aug – 04 Sep

postmaster@mscio.eu

0033 (0) 298 220 220

https://mscio.eu/

0033 (0) 298 220 170

OVERVIEW OF INCIDENTS IN THE VOLUNTARY REPORTING AREA (VRA)

CATEGORY	No.	Page Ref.
Armed Robbery	Nil	NSTR
Attack	1	2-3
Attempted Boarding	Nil	NSTR
Boarding	1	4
Hijack	Nil	NSTR
Kidnap	Nil	NSTR
Piracy	Nil	NSTR
Suspicious Activity	Nil	NSTR
Other Maritime Crimes	Nil	5 (NOTE 1)
Total Incidents	2	

Note 1: Although no event classified as "Other Maritime Crimes" has been reported to MSCIO, a statistic showing the reports received by MSCIO during the last three weeks is contained in page 5.

ATTACK

1. SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS IN THE VRA.

1. 1 TYPE OF INCIDENT: ATTACK.

1.2 PERIOD: 31 AUG 2025. (Time 1730UTC)

1.3 LOCATION: The Red Sea, 40nm southwest of Yanbu (Saudi Arabia).

2. RELEVANT INFORMATION RELATED TO THE ATTACK.

The master of MV SCARLET RAY (IMO 9799654) reported UKMTO to have been eyewitness of a splash in close proximity to their vessel. They could not identify what kind of projectile/ammunition was. However, they could notice a strong shake on board. This attack did not cause any damage nor the crew or the ship.

More information available in the following links:

MSCIO:
MSC IO | Alerts
120_JMIC_Information_Note_01_September_2025.pdf
UKMTO:
20250905_ukmto_summary_report-05sep25.pdf
120-jmic-information-note-01_september_2025.pdf
20250831-warning-029---25.pdf
JMIC:
120-jmic-information-note-01_september_2025.pdf
As a guide about actions that masters should take into account to face a similar event, consult JMIC EMERGENCY REFERENCE CARDS
jmic-bridge-emergency-reference-cards---middle-east---digital---rev20dec2024.pdf



Page 3 shows a summary of the attacks attributed to Houthis during the current year.

SUMMARY OF HOUTHIS ATTACK DURING 2025

1. SUMMARY OF HOUTIES ATTACK DURING 2025.
1.2 LOCATION: The Red Sea.
2. RELEVANT INFORMATION RELATED TO THE ATTACKS:

1 MV MAGIC SEAS. IMO 9736169.
Date: 06 JUL 25.
Location: 14 28'N – 042 03'E
Relevant information: The MV received an attack by using several kind of weapons including small weapons, RPGs (Rocket Propelled Grenades), USV (Unmanned Sea Vehicles) and, at least, one missile. As a consequence of major damages, the MV was sunk. The crew achieved to abandon the ship, being rescued by another MV.

2 MV ETERNITY C. IMO 9588249.
Date: 07 JUL 25.
Location: 14 42'N – 042 26'E
Relevant information: The MV received an attack by using different kind of weapons, including small weapons and RPGs (Rocket Propelled Grenades). Due to major damages on board, the MV was sunk. Casualties were reported.

3 MV SCARLET RAY. IMO 9799654.
Read page 2.



More information about the attacks in the following links:

MSCIO: MSCIO_ATALANTA_WEEKLY_REPORT_03_JUL-10_JUl_25 (1).pdf
UKMTO: 20250711_ukmto_summary_report-11july25.pdf
JMIC: Weekly Dashboard - draft 29.10
jmic-week-28-dashboard-07-july---13-july-2025.pdf
jmic-monthly-statistics---august---2025.pdf

SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY

1. SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS IN THE VRA.

1. 1 TYPE OF INCIDENT: SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY.

1.2 PERIOD: 04 SEP 2025. (Time 0310 UTC)

1.3 LOCATION: The Red Sea, 178NM northwest of Al Hudaydah, Yemen.

2. RELEVANT INFORMATION RELATED TO THE ATTACK.

The master of MV AGIOS NEKTARIOS I (IMO 9515759) reported UKMTO to have been eyewitness of a splash 7 nm from the vessel. It was not possible to identify what kind of projectile/ammunition was. Master reported vessel and crew are safe.

In the JMIC Information Note JMIC#121, JMIC assesses that MV AGIOS NEKTARIOS I was witnessed of a drone wreckage.
Note JMIC#121: 121-jmic-information-note-05_september_2025.pdf

More information available in the following links:

MSCIO: MSC IO | Alerts
UKMTO: Recent Incidents
20250904---ukmto_warning_incident_030-25.pdf
20250905_ukmto_summary_report-05sep25.pdf
JMIC:
As a guide about actions that masters could take into account to face a similar event, consult JMIC EMERGENCY REFERENCE CARDS
jmic-bridge-emergency-reference-cards---middle-east---digital---rev20dec2024.pdf

OTHER MARITIME CRIMES

1. SUMMARY OF THE GNSS EVENTS REGISTERED BY MSCIO FROM 15 AUG TO 04 SEP 2025.

In the map showed on the right side, a summary of all the events related with GNSS interferences happened during the last three weeks can be consulted.



Read note 2.

Although during the last three weeks, MSCIO has noticed a decrease in the number of the GNSS reports, the presence of a single lack of GNSS service in a limited area can provoke a high risk situation. So, MSCIO encourages to masters not only to be ready to face the GNNS interference effects, but also not to trust in the recent low statistics. Consulting some credited open sources, GNSS disruptions are currently being noted in areas such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea.

More information available in the following links:
MSCIO: MSC IO | Weekly Threat Assessment
UKMTO: 20250905_ukmto_summary_report-05sep25.pdf
JMIC: JMIC Week 34 Dashboard 18 August - 24 August 2025 (2).pdf
OPEN SOURCES:
IMO: Protect satellite navigation from interference, UN agencies urge
BIMCO: BIMCO Webinar: Lost at Sea: Confronting GPS Jamming and Spoofing in Maritime Operations



LAST PIRACY RELATED EVENTS (STATUS AND DETAILED DESCRIPTION)

No	Date	Name	MSE Category	Last info
45	7 FEB	**FV AL NAJMA**	Armed Robbery	Reported hijacked dhow ivo EYL. 6 hijackers. On 12 Feb, the hijackers left the dhow. No information of any ransom paid was confirmed
46	15 FEB	**FV SAYTUUN 2**	Armed Robbery	Reported hijacked vessel ivo EYL. 6 hijackers. On 22 Feb, the hijackers, after stealing the crew's belongings, abandoned the dhow. A ransom has been paid
47	16 MAR	**FV AL HIDAYA**	Armed Robbery	Hijack reported off the coast of "DURDURA" South of XAFUN, Somalia - 5 hijackers. After 5 days it was reported that the hijackers left the vessel. According to the Yemeni Authorities no ransom was paid.

Locations of the events 45, 46 and 47 are marked with in pag 8.

- Solved or closed cases
- Active cases
- Unsolved cases

PIRACY STATISTICS (NOV 2023 – SEP 2025)





Pirated (Outside TTW) / Armed Robbery at sea (Inside TTW)
- PAG takes control of the ship and requests a ransom

Piracy Attack
- PAG unsuccessful attack on ship

Hijack
- Attackers boarded and taken control of a ship against the crew's will

Boarding
- Successful attack but pirates do not take control

Suspicious Approach
- Suspicious maneuvering with clear intentions to attack. (weapons clearly displayed)

8/14/2025 | 2

Providing maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean

PIRACY SITUATION (NOV 2023 – SEP 2025)



Higher piracy threat on the coastal areas, based on the capability of PAG operating directly from the coast without mother ship and taking advantage of suitable weather

PIRACY ASSESSMENT

It is **ALMOST CERTAIN** that the PAGs (Pirate Action Groups) tactics for conducting piracy on the high seas involve hijacking a dhow and using it as a mother ship. The pirates then blend in with the usual traffic and deploy skiffs from the mother ship to attack vessels. They are able to navigate up to 600 nautical miles or more off the East Somali coast.

Nevertheless, from November 2024 it is becoming increasingly common for a group of people to organise themselves, identify a vulnerable ship close to the coast and use skiffs to carry out an attack. These attacks typically target Yemeni fishing dhows. While there is no confirmed information, it is **HIGHLY LIKELY** that ransoms would have been paid.

On the other hand, that risk could be amplified if local fishermen turn into pirates as a consequence that no effective action is being taken from the authorities to safeguard the Somali TTW from IUU (Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated) fishing.

THREAT ASSESSMENT	BENIGN	LOW	MODERATE	SUBSTANTIAL	SEVERE	CRITICAL
YARDSTICK	An attack is **HIGHLY UNLIKELY** (10% – 20%)	An attack is **UNLIKELY** (>25% – 35%)	An attack is a **REALISTIC POSSIBILITY** (40% – <50%)	An attack is **LIKELY / PROBABLE** (55% – <75%)	An attack is **HIGHLY LIKELY** (80% – 90%)	An attack is **ALMOST CERTAIN** (>95%)

PIRACY SITUATION (NOV 2023 – SEP 2025)

PIRACY ASSESSMENT

The PIRACY Threat Assessment (TA) is determined as **LOW** in the GULF OF ADEN and SOMALI BASIN, while it remains **MODERATE** in the coastal areas from LAASGORAY to the South of TITO.

It is a **REALISTIC POSSIBILITY** that two potential PAGs are active at unknown locations inland in the NE area of PUNTLAND

It is **ALMOST CERTAIN** that there are no PAGs at sea.



THREAT ASSESSMENT	BENIGN	LOW	MODERATE	SUBSTANTIAL	SEVERE	CRITICAL
YARDSTICK	An attack is **HIGHLY UNLIKELY** (10% – 20%)	An attack is **UNLIKELY** (>25% – 35%)	An attack is a **REALISTIC POSSIBILITY** (40% – <50%)	An attack is **LIKELY / PROBABLE** (55% – <75%)	An attack is **HIGHLY LIKELY** (80% – 90%)	An attack is **ALMOST CERTAIN** (>95%)

ATALANTA PIRACY THREAT UPDATE

ATALANTA	UPDATE ON THE PIRACY THREAT OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA	04 SEP 2025

Situation: Nothing significant to report

Pirates' modus operandi: The typical pirate strategy involves the seizure and hijacking of a dhow, which is subsequently utilized as a mother ship. The pirates then blend in with the usual traffic and deploy skiffs from the mother ship to attack vessels, navigating as far as 600 Nautical Miles or more, off the East Somali coast. The possibility of Attacks in the Gulf of Aden (GOA) should not be ignored, especially in the Eastern side. After a vessel is seized, it is likely that this is taken to the Somali coast and held there whilst ransom negotiations are ongoing.

REGISTRATION AND REPORTING

Registration and reporting. CSO's and masters are encourage to register their vessels with both MSCIO **(**https://mscio.eu/reporting/vessel-registration/**)** and UKMTO **(**https://www.ukmto.org/reporting-formats/initial-report**)** upon entering the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area and report all incidents to UKMTO and MSCIO.

When safe to do so, vessels should document incidents and suspicious activity through logs, photographs, video, and radar footage. CSOs should gather information on Pattern of Life and Maritime Situational Awareness for their planned routes and ports of call to support risk assessments. These procedures enable effective monitoring and resource allocation by CMF and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA.

Contact Information:

MSCIO:

Tel: 0033 (0) 298 220 220 // 0033 (0) 298 220 170

Website: www.mscio.eu

Email: postmaster@mscio.eu