



MSCIO ATALANTA WEEKLY REPORT

31st Oct – 06th Nov

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OVERVIEW OF INCIDENTS IN THE VOLUNTARY REPORTING AREA (VRA)



CATEGORY	No.	Page Ref.
 Armed Robbery	Nil	NSTR
 Attack	Nil	NSTR
 Attempted Boarding	1	Page 2
 Boarding	Nil	NSTR
 Hijack	Nil	NSTR
 Kidnap	Nil	NSTR
 Piracy	1	Page 3
 Suspicious Activity	Nil	NSTR
 Other Maritime Crimes	Nil	NSTR
Total Incidents	2	



ATTEMPTED BOARDING

1.1. TYPE OF INCIDENT: ATTEMPTED BOARDING.

1.2. PERIOD: 03 NOV 2025.

1.3. LOCATION: 322Nm Southeast from Mogadiscio. (00-03N 050-31E).

2. VESSELS DETAILS.

2.1. ATTACKED VESSEL.

MV STOLT SAGALAND.

2.2. ATTACKING VESSEL.

It is HIGHLY LIKELY that the Iranian Hijacked Dhow reported on 28/10/25 ([see IRTB 047](#)) was used as the mother vessel for this event. The Iranian dhow is probably named ISSAMOHAMDI and is not shining AIS.

3. RELEVANT INFORMATION RELATED WITH THE EVENT.

On 3rd Nov 25, MV STOLT SAGALAND (Cayman island flag) reported that 4 unauthorised persons attempted to board his vessel from a skiff. There was a mother ship 5NM from their position. Persons on board the small craft shoot several rounds from AK47 type weapon towards the MV. The PAST (security forces) on board MV STOLT SAGALAND started to shoot back and the small craft abandoned the attempt of boarding. Two more events took place the previous day in the vicinity.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS.

Vessels are requested to avoid the incident area and remain vigilant, as well as to adhere to BMP Maritime Security when transiting the Western Indian Ocean and the Somali waters.



More information available in the following links:

MSCIO:

[MSC IO | Alerts](#)

[20251103-Industry Releasable Threat Bulletin 48](#)

UKMTO:

[20251103-ukmto warning 039-update](#)



PIRACY

1.1. TYPE OF INCIDENT: PIRACY.

1.2. PERIOD: FM 6TH 0730 UTC TO 7TH NOV 1230 UTC.

1.3. LOCATION: 711Nm East from Mogadiscio. (02-07N 057-10E).

2. VESSELS DETAILS.

2.1. ATTACKED VESSEL.

MV HELLAS APHRODITE.

2.2. ATTACKING VESSEL.

Skiff coming from a fishing vessel (dhow). It is **HIGHLY LIKELY** that the Iranian Hijacked Dhow as described in the previous event ([page 2](#)) is involved.

3. RELEVANT INFORMATION RELATED WITH THE EVENT.

On 6th Nov 25, MV HELLAS APHORIDTE (Malta flag) reported that a small craft full of people approached to them and the craft opened fire with small arms and RPGs. The vessel was boarded and all the crew and Master were reported safe in the citadel. The unauthorised persons made several unsuccessful attempts to breach the citadel.

On 7th Nov, [EUNAVFOR OP. ATALANTA Special Operations Maritime Unit boarded the vessel to secure it](#), release the crew from the citadel and collect evidence from the pirates.

4. ANALYSIS

It is most likely that it is the same Pirates Action Group (PAG) which is involved in these events (from 02nd to 6th November), because of kinematic and temporal correlation, the use of a mother ship and same course of action.

They are agile (changing area of action), determined (don't hesitate to attack), and have real reach (up to 600Nm from coastline). This is an unprecedented sequence since the attack on the MV BASILISK on May 23, 2024.



More information available in the following links:

MSCIO:

[MSC IO | Alerts](#)

[20251106-Industry Releasable Threat Bulletin 48. UPDATE.](#)

UKMTO:

[20251103-ukmto_warning_040](#)

JMIC:

[JMIC Information Note - 6 November 2025](#)



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
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SUMMARY GNSS EVENTS

1. SUMMARY OF THE GNSS EVENTS REGISTERED BY MSCIO FROM 17th OCT to 6th NOV 2025.


In the map showed on the right side, a summary of all the events related with GNSS interferences happened during the last three weeks can be consulted.



Although MSCIO has not receive any GNSS reports during recent days, the presence of a single lack of GNSS service in a limited area can provoke a high risk situation. Therefore, MSCIO encourages masters not only to be ready to face the GNSS interference effects, but also to not trust in recent low statistics. Credited open sources show that GNSS disruptions are currently being noted in areas such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.

More information available in the following links:

NAVWARN:hydrography.paknavy.gov.pk/wp-content/plugins/navarea-warnings/custom_uploaded_warnings_for_navarea/20251013SEC474.txt



OPEN SOURCES: [MSC IO](#) | [Maritime Cybersecurity Information](#)



MSCIO WEBSITE. USEFUL LINKS

To know more about different maritime security threats, please access to the following links:

[MSC IO | Useful Links](#)

1. General Maritime Security:

[MSC IO | General Maritime Security](#)

2. Maritime Terrorism:

[MSC IO | Maritime Terrorism](#)

3. Piracy Information:

[MSC IO | Piracy Information](#)

4. Illegal Traffic and Fishing


[MSC IO | Illegal Traffic & Fishing](#)

5. Maritime Cybersecurity Information.

[MSC IO | Maritime Cybersecurity Information](#)


6. Submarine Critical Infrastructure.

[MSC IO | Submarine Critical Infrastructure](#)



LAST PIRACY RELATED EVENTS (STATUS AND DETAILED DESCRIPTION)

No	Date	Name	MSE Category	Last info.
45	7 FEB	FV AL NAJMA	Armed Robbery	Reported hijacked dhow ivo EYL. 6 hijackers. On 12 Feb, the hijackers left the dhow. No information of any ransom paid was confirmed.
46	15 FEB	FV SAYTUUN 2	Armed Robbery	Reported hijacked vessel ivo EYL. 6 hijackers. On 22 Feb, the hijackers, after stealing the crew's belongings, abandoned the dhow. A ransom has been paid.
47	16 MAR	FV AL-HIDAYA	Armed Robbery	Hijack reported off the coast of "DURDURA" South of XAFUN, Somalia - 5 hijackers. After 5 days it was reported that the hijackers left the vessel. According to Yemeni authorities no ransom has been paid.
48	28 OCT	FV 314055ISSAMOHAMDI	Armed Robbery	Hijack reported off the coast of Garacad.
49	02 NOV	FV INTERTUNA TRES	Piracy Attack	362nm East of Mogadishu, Master reports 4 unauthorized persons attempted to board his vessel using a skiff. The boarding was repelled by the PAST onboard who shot 2 warning shots.
50	03 NOV	MV STOL SAGALAND	Piracy Attack	332nm East of Mogadishu, Master reports 4 unauthorized persons attempted to board his vessel using a skiff. The boarding was repelled by the PAST onboard which exchanged fire with the PAG.
51	06 NOV	MT HELLAS APHRODITE	Piracy Attack	760nm East of Mogadishu. MT was boarded by PAG. Op Atalanta currently (07/11/25) Liberating the vessel.
52	11 NOV	MT AL THUMAMA	Piracy Attack	714nm NE of Mogadishu (120NM North of event 51) Master reports being approached by a skiff with 3 PAGS. The MT managed to outrun the skiff.


Locations of the events are marked with  in page 8.

 Solved or closed cases
  Active cases
  Unsolved cases




PIRACY STATISTICS (NOV 2023 – OCT 2025)

51 Events



PIRACY RELATED EVENTS



Pirated (Outside TTW) / Armed Robbery at sea (Inside TTW)

- PAG takes control of the ship and requests a ransom

Piracy Attack

- PAG unsuccessful attack on ship

Hijack

- Attackers boarded and taken control of a ship against the crew's will

Boarding

- Successful attack but pirates do not take control

Suspicious Approach

- Suspicious maneuvering with clear intentions to attack. (weapons clearly displayed)




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PIRACY SITUATION (NOV 2023 – OCT 2025)



PIRACY ASSESSMENT

It is **ALMOST CERTAIN** that the PAG's tactics for conducting piracy on the high seas involve hijacking a dhow and using it as a mother ship. The pirates then blend in with the usual traffic and deploy skiffs from the mother ship to attack vessels. They are able to navigate to the high seas, with evidence of events up to up to 600 nautical miles off the East Somali coast.

Nevertheless, from November 2024 it is becoming increasingly common for a group of people to organise themselves, identify a vulnerable ship close to the coast and use skiffs to carry out an attack. These attacks typically target Yemeni fishing dhows. While there is no confirmed information, it is **HIGHLY LIKELY** that ransoms would have been paid.

On the other hand, that risk could be amplified if local fishermen turn into pirates as a consequence that no effective action is being taken from the authorities to safeguard Somali TTW from IUUF.

ATALANTA PIRACY THREAT UPDATE


PIRACY ASSESSMENT

The PIRACY Threat Assessment (TA) is determined as **LOW** in the GULF OF ADEN.

While in PA16, PA17, PA27 and PA28 the PIRACY Threat Assessment is determined as **SUBSTANTIAL**.

It is **ALMOST CERTAIN** that PAGs are active in PA 21 and PA 22.

N04, N05 and N06 and E1 to E6 remain **MODERATE**.



THREAT ASSESSMENT	BENIGN	LOW	MODERATE	SUBSTANTIAL	SEVERE	CRITICAL
YARDSTICK	An attack is HIGHLY UNLIKELY (10% – 20%)	An attack is UNLIKELY (>25% – 35%)	An attack is a REALISTIC POSSIBILITY (40% – <50%)	An attack is LIKELY / PROBABLE (55% – <75%)	An attack is HIGHLY LIKELY (80% – 90%)	An attack is ALMOST CERTAIN (>95%)



REGISTRATION AND REPORTING

Registration and reporting.

CSO's and masters are encouraged to register their vessels upon entering the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area with both:

- MSCIO (<https://mscio.eu/reporting/vessel-registration/>)
- UKMTO (<https://www.ukmto.org/reporting-formats/initial-report>)

And report all incidents to UKMTO and MSCIO.

When safe to do so, vessels should document incidents and suspicious activity through logs, photographs, video, and radar footage. CSOs should gather information on Pattern of Life and Maritime Situational Awareness for their planned routes and ports of call to support risk assessments. These procedures enable effective monitoring and resource allocation by CMF and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA.

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