



# **MSCIO ATALANTA WEEKLY REPORT**

---

**18th – 24th April**

---


✉ [postmaster@mscio.eu](mailto:postmaster@mscio.eu)

☎ 0033 (0) 298 220 220

🌐 <https://mscio.eu/>

☎ 0033 (0) 298 220 170

# OVERVIEW OF INCIDENTS IN THE VOLUNTARY REPORTING AREA (VRA)



| CATEGORY                | No.      | Page Ref. |
|-------------------------|----------|-----------|
| 📍 Armed Robbery         | Nil      | NSTR      |
| 📍 Attack                | Nil      | NSTR      |
| 📍 Attempted Boarding    | Nil      | NSTR      |
| 📍 Boarding              | Nil      | NSTR      |
| 📍 Hijack                | Nil      | NSTR      |
| 📍 Kidnap                | Nil      | NSTR      |
| 📍 Piracy                | Nil      | NSTR      |
| 📍 Suspicious Activity   | Nil      | NSTR      |
| 📍 Other Maritime Crimes | Nil      | NSTR      |
| <b>Total Incidents</b>  | <b>0</b> |           |


## LAST PIRACY RELATED EVENTS (STATUS AND DETAILED DESCRIPTION)

| No | Date   | Name         | MSE Category  | Last info  |
|----|--------|--------------|---------------|--|
| 45 | 7 FEB  | FV AL NAJMA  | Armed Robbery | Reported hijacked dhow ivo EYL. 6 hijackers. On 12 Feb, the hijackers left the dhow. No information of any ransom paid was confirmed   |
| 46 | 15 FEB | FV SAYTUUN 2 | Armed Robbery | Reported hijacked vessel ivo EYL. 6 hijackers. On 22 Feb, the hijackers, after stealing the crew's belongings, abandoned the dhow. A ransom has been paid  |
| 47 | 16 MAR | FV AL HIDAYA | Armed Robbery | Hijack reported off the coast of "DURDURA" South of XAFUN - 5 hijackers.<br>According to Yemeni authorities no ransom has been paid, however, HUMINT INFO from "Rizzo" FA points that a ransom could have been paid. |




# PIRACY STATISTICS (NOV 2023 – 2025)

47 Events



## PIRACY RELATED EVENTS



Pirated (Outside TTW) / Armed Robbery at sea (Inside TTW)

- PAG takes control of the ship and requests a ransom

Piracy Attack

- PAG unsuccessful attack on ship

Hijack

- Attackers boarded and taken control of a ship against the crew's will

Boarding

- Successful attack but pirates do not take control


Suspicious Approach

- Suspicious maneuvering with clear intentions to attack. (weapons clearly displayed)





# PIRACY SITUATION (NOV 2023 – APR 2025)



## PIRACY ASSESSMENT

It is **ALMOST CERTAIN** that the PAG's tactics for conducting piracy on the high seas involve hijacking a dhow and using it as a mother ship. The pirates then blend in with the usual traffic and deploy skiffs from the mother ship to attack vessels. They are able to navigate up to 600 nautical miles or more off the East Somali coast.

On the other hand, that risk could be amplified if local fishermen turn into pirates as a consequence that no effective action is being taken from the authorities to safeguard Somali TTW from IUU fishing.

It is a **REALISTIC POSIBILITY** that two potential PAGs are active at unknown locations inland between QANDALA AND GARACAD. It is assessed that no PAG is currently on high seas.

## PIRACY THREAT UPDATE

ATALANTA

UPDATE ON THE PIRACY THREAT OFF THE  
COAST OF SOMALIA

24 APR 2025

**Situation:** Nothing significant to report

**Pirates' modus operandi:** The typical pirate strategy involves the seizure and hijacking of a dhow, which is subsequently utilized as a mother ship. The pirates then blend in with the usual traffic and deploy skiffs from the mother ship to attack vessels, navigating as far as 600 Nautical Miles or more, off the East Somali coast. The possibility of Attacks in the Gulf of Aden (GOA) should not be ignored, especially in the Eastern side. After a vessel is seized, it is likely that this is taken to the Somali coast and held there whilst ransom negotiations are ongoing.

**Threat evaluation:** These armed robberies within Somali territorial waters demonstrate an active and evolving threat in the region. Despite routine patrols conducted by CMF, EUNAVFOR ATALANTA and other warships in these waters, pirates continue to demonstrate sophisticated operational capabilities. These incidents highlight the existence of well-established coastal support infrastructure and the ability to conduct coordinated operations. The successful execution of recent attacks indicates that pirate action groups maintain the capability and intent to target vessels in this region. This assessment is supported by their demonstrated ability to operate within territorial waters, utilize multiple coastal locations, and sustain extended operations



**Registration and reporting.** CSO's and masters must register their vessels with both MSCIO (<https://mscio.eu/reporting/vessel-registration/>) and UKMTO (<https://www.ukmto.org/reporting-formats/initial-report>) upon entering the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area and report all incidents to UKMTO in accordance with BMP. When safe to do so, vessels should document incidents and suspicious activity through logs, photographs, video, and radar footage. CSOs should gather information on Pattern of Life and Maritime Domain Awareness for their planned routes and ports of call to support risk assessments. These procedures enable effective monitoring and resource allocation by CMF and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA.

#### **Contact Information:**

##### **MSCIO:**

**Tel:** 0033 (0) 298 220 220 // 0033 (0) 298 220 170

**Website:** [www.mscio.eu](http://www.mscio.eu)

**Email:** [postmaster@mscio.eu](mailto:postmaster@mscio.eu)

